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Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: 
It's a Question of Priorities* 
Conflicting case law exists regarding the proper treatment of 
environmental claims in bankruptcy-primarily in the contexts of a 
trustee s power to abandon contaminated property, a debtors 
ability to receive a discharge of environmental liability, and a 
creditors request for administrative priority. This Comment 
evaluates criteria courts have established for characterizing 
environmental claims and for determining their priority in bankrupt-
cy. It examines the relationships between the trustees abandonment 
power, the priority of environmental claims, and the determination 
of when a claim arises. Criteria are suggested for characterizing 
environmental claims and for determining their priority in bankrupt-
cy which resolve the conflicting case law and result in a uniform 
and consistent application of the Bankruptcy Code, environmental 
law, and Supreme Court precedent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, hazardous substances have become a great 
national concern due to their severe impact on the environment and 
public health and safety. Both Congress and state legislatures have 
enacted comprehensive environmental laws to address existing and future 
problems associated with hazardous waste. Under these laws, businesses 
or individuals may find themselves liable for the substantial costs of 
identification, removal, and disposal of hazardous waste. Faced with 
such liability, a party may choose or be forced to seek protection from 
the financial burden in bankruptcy. 
The goal of the bankruptcy law is to rehabilitate the debtor by· 
allowing the debtor to discharge prepetition debts, abandon property, and 
make pro rata payoffs to creditors. 1 The goal of environmental law is 
to protect the environment and preserve public health and safety by 
imposing liability for hazardous waste cleanup. The goals of bankruptcy 
and environmental law come into conflict when individuals or business-
1. There is serious disagreement among scholars regarding the policies behind 
bankruptcy law and the source of the rights which are administered in bankruptcy. Some 
scholars view loss distribution as the central policy concern of bankruptcy. They believe 
that creditors' state-defined rights are redefined in bankruptcy through the process of 
loss distribution. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 775 (1987). 
Other scholars view bankruptcy as administration of the collection efforts of creditors 
with state-defined rights. Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and 
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 815 (1987). 
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es, subject to environmental liability they are financially unable or 
unwilling to satisfy, seek protection in bankruptcy. This conflict has 
· been the subject of much discussion in recent years. 
The fundamental issue in resolving this conflict is under what 
circumstances and to what extent is a bankruptcy estate liable for an 
environmental claim-for example, the cleanup costs of contaminated 
estate property. Conflicting case law exists regarding this issue because 
courts disagree on whether to prioritize environmental policy or 
bankruptcy policy ahead of the other. Additionally, courts often fail to 
give proper consideration to either the "priority" of environmental claims 
outside of bankruptcy or the lack of "priority" of environmental claims 
in bankruptcy. 
Determining the proper treatment of environmental claims in 
bankruptcy requires consideration of the priority of claims in three legal 
contexts. First, the priority of environmental claims relative to other 
claims outside of bankruptcy must be understood by looking at state law 
and federal nonbankruptcy law. Second, the priority of environmental 
claims relative to other claims in bankruptcy must be understood by 
looking at the Bankruptcy Code.2 Third, the priority of environmental 
objectives relative to bankruptcy objectives must be considered by 
looking at the competing policies behind bankruptcy law and environ-
mental law. 
This Comment evaluates criteria courts have established for character-
izing environmental claims and for determining their priority in 
bankruptcy. Part II provides a brief summary of relevant environmental 
and bankruptcy law. Part III analyzes criteria for determining when an 
environmental claim arises and the consequences of that determination. 
Part IV discusses the trustee's power to abandon property subject to 
environmental liability and the consequences of abandonment. Part V 
addresses the bankruptcy estate's liability for environmental claims and 
the prioritization of those claims. Finally, part VI suggests criteria for 
characterizing environmental claims and for determining their proper 
priority in bankruptcy. These criteria resolve the conflicting case law 
and result in a uniform and consistent application of the Bankruptcy 
Code and Supreme Court precedent. 
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). 
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IL LEGISLATION 
A. Environmental Law 
An increasing amount of environmental legislation and litigation 
evince the heightened importance of environmental responsibility in our 
society. The handling and disposal of hazardous waste as well as the 
remediation of contaminated property have become tremendous concerns. 
Substantial numbers of properties contaminated with toxic substances 
caused by improper hazardous waste handling and disposal procedures 
threaten public health and safety. Traditionally, environmental 
legislation has served to prevent future environmental damage by 
regulating the conduct of potential polluters. However, some more 
recent environmental legislation serves to remedy preexisting environ-
mental damage by authorizing the government to respond immediately 
to hazards which threaten the public. Environmental liability can arise 
in various forms, including an obligation to pay for environmental 
cleanup expenses incurred by the government or others, an obligation to 
perform a cleanup directly, or an obligation to refrain from polluting in 
the future. 
One of the most extensive environmental laws governing liability for 
hazardous waste is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).3 Under 
CERCLA, the President, who has delegated his power to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), is authorized to dispose of hazardous 
waste and to remediate contaminated property when there is an imminent 
and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.4 After the EPA 
has discovered a hazardous release, it assesses the site and determines 
the degree of risk to human health and the environment. The EPA 
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988)). 
4. CERCLA provides that: 
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial 
threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or 
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contami-
nant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public 
health or welfare, the President is authorized to act . . . to remove . . . and 
provide for remedial action . . . or take any other response measure . . . 
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment. 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(l) (1988). 
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places those sites with a sufficiently high degree of risk on the National 
Priorities List (NPL).5 
Congress has established a "Superfund" which provides a source of 
immediate funding to the EPA for hazardous waste cleanup operations. 
Under CERCLA, the EPA may undertake a cleanup, using funds from 
the Superfund, and recoup its response costs by bringing an action 
against potentially responsible parties (PRPs).6 Liability for the EPA's 
response costs is sorted out after the cleanup. Alternatively, the EPA 
may order the present owner of contaminated property to take cleanup 
action7 and thus bear the :financial burden.8 Either way, liability of 
PRPs is broad and can be substantial. The PRPs are held jointly and 
severally liable for the hazardous waste cleanup and disposal costs.9 
CERCLA liability is imposed not only on those parties responsible for 
hazardous waste releases but also on those parties currently in possession 
of contaminated property.1° CERCLA also has provisions permitting 
private parties to bring civil actions against PRPs for the recovery of 
their expenses in cleaning up contaminated property. 11 
Other federal statutes impose liability for different types of environ-
mental harm or impose liability on other parties. For example, the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)12 imposes 
liability for toxic waste cleanup not only on property owners, regardless 
of fault, but also on all those involved, from the generation of the 
hazardous waste through the disposal of it. Many state legislatures have 
enacted similar types of environmental legislation. 
Although environmental legislation is..in place that imposes liability on 
responsible parties for cleanup and hazardous waste disposal, such 
5. Id. § 9605(c). 
6. Potentially responsible parties, those "covered persons" upon whom liability 
is imposed by CERCLA, include: (1) the current owner or operator of the site, (2) the 
owner or operator of the site at the time of the contamination, (3) the person who 
arranged for the disposal of the waste, and ( 4) the person who transported the waste to 
the site. Id. § 9607(a)(l)-(4). 
7. Id. § 9606(a). 
8. However, the owner may seek contribution from other PRPs. Id.§ 9613(f)(l). 
9. United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
10. Id. § 9607(a)(l). 
11. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act in 
1986 explicitly created a right of contribution. Any person may seek contribution from 
any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a). Id. § 9613(f). 
12. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 
2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)). 
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legislation often fails to establish a priority for the liability imposed, 
making enforcement difficult. A legislature may choose to create a 
superpriority lien, a secured lien subordinate to all existing perfected 
liens, or an unsecured interest in remediated property based on environ-
mental liability. The power and authority to prioritize environmental 
liability is in the hands of the legislatures, not federal bankruptcy courts. 
Some environmental laws establish a priority by creating a lien on the 
remediated property, junior to any existing and perfected security 
interests, to secure the repayment of response costs incurred by the 
government. 13 Unfortunately, when environmental liability exists on 
an encumbered property, a junior lien often provides the government 
with little, if any, protection at all. A few states have environmental 
legislation that creates a superpriority lien on remediated property to 
secure repayment of response costs. A superpriority lien receives 
priority ahead of all other secured creditors. Superpriority liens are 
uncommon and the consequences are somewhat unsatisfying because 
they simply shift the burden of insuring against environmental liability 
from the government to lenders. 
Part of the reason for the substantial conflict in case law regarding the 
treatment of environmental claims in bankruptcy is the failure of state 
and federal law to establish a priority for environmental claims outside 
of bankruptcy. Legislatures have the power to establish priorities by 
creating liens on property to secure the payment of environmental 
liabilities. Those priorities, established under state or federal law, are 
respected in bankruptcy. However, when state or federal legislatures fail 
to prioritize environmental claims above others, should a bankruptcy 
court create such a priority? This Comment carefully considers this 
issue and concludes that although important environmental policies may 
support such a proposition, a bankruptcy court is not free to create rights 
and priorities which do not exist under nonbankruptcy law. Such powers 
must remain in the capable hands of the legistlatures. 
B. Bankruptcy Law 
Bankruptcy provides debtors an opportunity to satisfy creditors by 
liquidating assets or reorganizing their affairs under the protection of the 
Bankruptcy Code.14 Bankruptcy, by imposing a collective, compulsory 
13. For example, CERCLA includes a provision giving the government a lien on 
remediated property which arises when cleanup costs have been incurred, but the lien 
is subject to existing perfected liens. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(/) (1988). 
14. An individual liquidates under chapter 7 and reorganizes under chapter 13. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 701-766, 1301-1330 (1988). A corporation usually liquidates under chapter 
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proceeding, forces all of the creditors to act as one for the benefit of the 
whole group.15 One objective of bankruptcy is to assure equal and 
identical treatment of all creditors with the same type of claim, thus 
preventing any creditor from receiving preferential treatment. A second 
objective is to provide the debtor with a fresh start by allowing the 
debtor to discharge debts incurred before bankruptcy. 16 
A debtor seeks relief by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court. 17 
When the debtor files, a bankruptcy "estate" is created which contains 
all of the debtor's assets and liabilities. The fundamental purpose of a 
chapter 7 bankruptcy is to liquidate the estate assets while maximizing 
the size of the estate for the benefit of the creditors. Under chapter 7 a 
trustee will take control of the debtor's assets and liabilities and liquidate 
the estate to satisfy the demands of the creditors to the greatest extent 
possible. The fundamental purpose of a chapter 11 bankruptcy is the 
rehabilitation of the debtor's business. Chapter 11 is useful for 
businesses which might be successfully rehabilitated rather than being 
subjected to an economically wasteful liquidation. The debtor often 
administers a chapter 11 bankruptcy estate, acting in the fiduciary role 
of "debtor in possession," while continuing to operate the business 
during the reorganization. 
Creditors may assert "claims" against the bankruptcy estate for 
liabilities incurred by the debtor before bankruptcy or by the trustee 
during the bankruptcy. A "claim" is a "right to payment" or a "right to 
an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise 
to a right to payment."18 A claim may.be contingent or actual and may 
7, but may liquidate all or part of a business under chapter 11. A corporation 
reorganizes under chapter 11. Id. §§ 701-766, 1101-1174. 
15. Thomas H. Jackson, Who Pays? Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, STAN. LAW., Fall 
1985, at 8, 10. 
16. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266-67; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08; see also Williams v. United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) (recognizing the bankruptcy objec-
tive of providing a debtor with a "fresh start"). 
17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(a) (1988). 
18. Id. § 101(5). This provision states: 
'[C]laim' means -
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, 
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or 
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be unliquidated, unmatured, or disputed. A "debt" is liability on a 
claim.19 A "creditor" is an entity that has a claim against the debtor 
that arose before the bankruptcy.2° Claims are classified as either 
prepetition or postpetition. Prepetition environmental claims arise from 
liability incurred by the debtor before the filing of the bankruptcy. 
Postpetition claims arise from liability incurred by the bankruptcy estate 
after the bankruptcy was filed. The bankruptcy is intended to preserve 
and distribute the debtor's assets to creditors who assert claims against 
a debtor for liabilities incurred prepetition. The bankruptcy is also 
intended to discharge the debtor's liability for those debts.21 
The distinction between prepetition and postpetition claims is very 
important. In general, a debtor is discharged and no longer personally 
liable for prepetition obligations unless the obligation is outside the 
Code's definition of "claim" and "debt" or the obligation falls within an 
exception to discharge under section 523(a).22 Bankruptcy Code 
section 72723 governs the discharge of a chapter 7 debtor while section 
114l(d)24 governs the discharge of a chapter 11 debtor. Section 523 
identifies claims which cannot be discharged by individual debtors. 
Although a debtor's prepetition debts are discharged in bankruptcy, the 
debtor is not discharged of liability incurred postpetition, even if the 
debtor is operating under the protection of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Claims asserted by creditors against a debtor typically arise under 
nonbankruptcy law--usually state law. Nonbankruptcy law categorizes 
creditors as either secured or unsecured. Bankruptcy law honors the 
Id. 
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable 
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 
19. Id. § 101(12). 
20. Id. § 101(10). 
21. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 112 B.R. 513, 524 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), ajf'd 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) ("IT]he Bankruptcy Code manifests 
a strong and clearly expressed congressional intent that a debtor be discharged from all 
claims, both actual and contingent, which arise out of pre-petition conduct."). 
22. Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Fundamental 
Framework, 44 FLA. L. REV. 153, 158 (1992). 
23. The court shall grant an individual debtor a discharge, unless the debtor falls 
into one of the exceptions to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988). Most exceptions 
to discharge are based on the debtor's fraud or misconduct or the fact that the debtor has 
previously been discharged. A discharge under section 727(a) discharges the debtor 
from all debts that arose prepetition. Id. §§ 523(a), 727(a), (b). 
24. The confirmation of a plan discharges the debtor from any debt that arose 
before the confirmation. Id. § 114l(d)(l)(A). The confirmation of a plan does not 
discharge an individual debtor from any debt excepted under section 523. Id. § 
1141(d)(2). 
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valid and perfected liens of secured creditors. A secured creditor 
receives the proceeds from the sale of the collateral which secured the 
debt.25 In addition, the secured creditor may make a claim against the 
debtor's bankruptcy estate for any de:ficiency.26 Thus, the "priority" of 
a creditor's lien on the debtor's property established under 
nonbankruptcy law is respected in bankruptcy and is unaltered. 
Creditors who have allowed,27 unsecured claims may share in the 
distribution of estate assets in a chapter 7 or 11 liquidation or participate 
in the debtor's chapter 11 reorganization plan. The distribution of estate 
assets to unsecured creditors is made according to a priority established 
in the Bankruptcy Code.28 Pursuant to the Code, administrative 
expenses incurred during the bankruptcy receive first priority and are 
paid in full, to the extent funds are available to do so.29 Priority 
unsecured claims are paid next, and general unsecured claims are paid 
last.30 Typically, funds are insufficient to satisfy all claims, and 
distribution is made on a pro rata basis in proportion to the amount of 
claims relative to the total estate assets. 
The bankruptcy court may authorize priority payment of administrative 
expenses incurred by the bankruptcy estate postpetition.31 Administra-
tive expenses include "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving the estate. "32 A postpetition claim may or may not be 
entitled to administrative expense priority. Not all postpetition claims 
are administrative expenses. If a postpetition claim does not qualify as 
an administrative expense, it is treated as a postpetition general 
unsecured claim. 
25. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a claim is secured to the extent of the 
value of the creditor's interest in its collateral. Id. § 506(a). The Code also provides 
that the trustee shall dispose of property in which a secured creditor ( or any other entity 
other than the estate) has an interest. Id. § 725. 
26. The Bankruptcy Code provides that the secured creditor's allowed claim is an 
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest in its collateral 
is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Id. § 506(a). 
27. The Bankruptcy Code requires creditors who seek payment in bankruptcy to 
file a proof of claim or interest. Id. § 501. The Code also provides procedures for the 
allowance of such claims or interests in bankruptcy. Id. § 502. 
28. Id. § 507(a). 
29. Id. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(l). 
30. Id. §§ 507(a)(2), 502(t). 
31. Id. § 503. 
32. Id. § 503(b)(l)(A). 
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The Bankruptcy Code defines a "claim" and establishes the priority for 
payment of various classes of claims. Although bankruptcy law 
establishes the priority for payment of various classes of claims, it does 
not determine the class into which a particular claim falls. That is 
determined by nonbankruptcy law. For example, state law establishes 
the priority of a lender's recorded deed of trust; that priority is respected 
in bankruptcy. 
III. DISCHARGEABILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS IN 
BANKRUPTCY 
The issue of the proper treatment of environmental claims in 
bankruptcy arises in two common, yet opposing, contexts: (1) the 
dischargeability of environmental claims and (2) the prioritization of 
environmental claims for the purpose of sharing in the distribution of 
estate assets. In either context, a court's analysis must begin with a 
determination of whether the environmental liability constitutes a "claim" 
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, and if so, when the claim 
arose-prepetition or postpetition. A distinction must be made between 
the existence of a claim pursuant to section 101(5) and the 
dischargeability of a claim pursuant to sections 727 and 1141(d)(l)(A). 
The existence of a claim does not assure the dischargeability of that 
claim. Few courts distinguish between the issue of when a claim arises 
and when a claim is dischargeable in bankruptcy. This section identifies 
difficulties in making these determinations and suggests criteria for doing 
so that are consistent with both environmental and bankruptcy law 
objectives. 
Classification of an environmental claim as either prepetition or 
postpetition can be complicated be~ause prepetition acts or occurrences 
frequently have postpetition consequences. An environmental claim may 
arise when the debtor first acts (for example, by placing hazardous waste 
in a disposal site), when the hazardous waste is released, when the 
release is discovered, or when the cost of hazardous waste cleanup is 
incurred. This classification problem, however, is not unique to 
environmental liability. Other forms of liability present equally difficult 
classification problems. For example, tort claims are difficult to classify 
because a tortious act may occur prepetition but the consequences may 
not develop for many years or may only be discovered postpetition. 
The characterization of a claim as prepetition or postpetition is 
significant because it affects the determinations of whether the claim is 
dischargeable, and if it is not, whether the claim should be treated as a 
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general unsecured claim or a claim entitled to administrative priority.33 
If a creditor has a prepetition environmental claim, it is subject to 
discharge and the creditor is one of many unsecured creditors paid on a 
pro rata basis after payment of administrative expenses and higher 
priority unsecured claims. If a creditor has a postpetition environmental 
claim, it may qualify as an administrative expense. 
The question of whether an environmental "claim" is dischargeable 
was addressed by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Kovacs.34 The Court 
held that prepetition environmental claims which could be properly 
characterized as demands for money were dischargeable.35 However, 
the decision did not alter the duty of the debtor to obey an injunction 
which prohibited the debtor from creating any further pollution.36 The 
injunction was not dischargeable. The Kovacs case raised the fundamen-
tal questions: (1) what type of environmental liability will be considered 
a "claim" for purposes of discharge in bankruptcy and (2) when does an 
environmental claim arise. Several tests have been developed by the 
courts to determine when an environmental claim arises and whether it 
is dischargeable. 
A. The Legal Relationship Test 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit37 and a few other 
33. See supra part H.B. 
34. 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
35. Id. at 275, 281. 
36. Id. at 284-85. 
37. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
hazardous waste cleanup costs arising from debtor's prepetition activities could be 
asserted against the reorganized debtor because no legal relationship existed to establish 
a prepetition contingent CERCLA claim and that a CERCLA claim could 
not arise before CERCLA was created), cert. denied, Penn Cent. Corp. v. United States, 
503 U.S. 906 (1992); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.) 
( explaining that tort "claims" did not arise until plaintiffs suffered identifiable and 
compensable injuries from exposure to asbestos, at which time a legal relationship arose 
simultaneously with the plaintiffs' cause of action), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); 
Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 
1984) (deciding that when debtor's accountant sought indemnification from the debtor 
after several banks brought suit against the accountant postpetition, a "claim" did not 
arise until the accountant filed an answer in the underlying lawsuit), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1160 (1985). 
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courts38 have considered the legal relationship between parties in 
making the determination of when a claim arises. A legal relationship 
must exist between the creditor and debtor which gives rise to the claim. 
Strictly construed, the legal relationship test requires that a claimant have 
an existing cause of action in order to establish a claim in bankruptcy. 
For example, applying this criterion to a tort, a negligent act does not 
give rise to a claim until the tort victim suffers identifiable, compensable 
injury, as required for a cause of action to accrue under state law.39 
Courts, in applying this criterion to environmental liability, have refused 
to recognize a contingent prepetition CERCLA claim when the 
government has not incurred any response costs prepetition because the 
government has no cause of action against the debtor under CERCLA 
until it incurs response costs.4° CERCLA does not give rise to a 
cognizable legal claim until funds have been expended or remedial 
measures have been taken to address environmental hazards. To foster 
rapid cleanups, Congress has adopted a policy of delaying litigation to 
determine environmental liability until after the investigation and 
cleanup. 
One problem with the legal relationship test is that it fails to 
differentiate between a claim in bankruptcy and a cause of action under 
nonbankruptcy law. Although nonbankruptcy law governs the existence 
of a claim in bankruptcy, it is not dispositive of when a claim arises.41 
Under the current Bankruptcy Code, the definition of "claim" includes 
contingent, unliquidated, and unmatured claims.42 Under the former 
Code, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,43 creditors could only assert 
38. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc. (In re Allegheny Int'l, 
Inc.), 126 B.R. 919 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that a "claim" arises when a cause 
of action is established under CERCLA; which occurs only after the claimant has 
incurred some response costs); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831 
(D. Minn. 1990) (arguing that nonbankruptcy substantive law defines when a particular 
relationship between a debtor and a third party amounts to a legal obligation giving rise 
to a bankruptcy "claim" and that under CERCLA the government must incur response 
costs to establish a legal obligation); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (finding that future unknown claimants who have been exposed 
to asbestos but have not yet manifested injuries do not have bankruptcy "claims"). 
39. Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 864 (1985); In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1986). But see In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding 
that a "claim" for bankruptcy purposes may include liability to tort victims exposed to 
asbestos who have not yet manifested asbestos-related injuries and therefore have not 
accrued a cause of action under state law). 
40. Allegheny, 126 B.R. at 925; Union Scrap, 123 B.R. at 835. 
41. In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 405 (N.D. Tex. 1992). 
42. See supra note 18. 
43. The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed 1978)). 
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"provable" claims. Parties holding contingent or unliquidated claims 
were excluded from the distribution of estate assets. As a result, the 
debtor's fresh start was impaired because such claims were not 
discharged and creditors were able to pursue the debtor after bankruptcy. 
Congress has abolished the provability requirement. The current Code 
includes procedures for courts to estimate . contingent or unliquidated 
claims44 so that the claims may be paid and the debtor discharged. 
However, the legal relationship test excludes contingent and unmatured 
claims from bankruptcy. Consequently, adhering to the legal relation-
ship test adds the concept of provability into the meaning of "claim," 
which the drafters of the Code specifically intended to abolish.45 Thus, 
the legal relationship test is in direct conflict with the existing Code as 
well as with congressional intent. 46 
A second problem with the legal relationship test is that it precludes 
creditors with contingent or unmatured claims from sharing in the 
distribution of estate assets in a chapter 7 liquidation. If unincurred 
response costs for cleanup of prepetition releases are not valid contingent 
claims, then environmental agencies will be uncompensated by a 
corporation in a chapter 7 liquidation.47 In addition, preventing a claim 
from arising until a cause of action accrues inhibits the debtor's ability 
to discharge prepetition liability and start anew.48 · 
A related problem with the legal relationship test is that a debtor may 
be precluded from effectuating a reorganization under chapter 11. 
Although unincurred response costs may not constitute a claim, that 
contingent liability may be substantial_ nonetheless and may impair the 
44. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988). The legislative history explains that "contingent 
or unmatured claims are to be liquidated by the bankruptcy court in order to afford the 
debtor complete 
bankruptcy relief." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 352 (1978), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6308; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5848. 
45. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
46. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code's legislative history states that "[ a ]11 claims against 
the debtor, whether or not contingent or unliquidated, will be dealt with in the 
bankruptcy case . . . . The proposed law will permit a complete settlement of the affairs 
of a bankrupt debtor, and a complete discharge and fresh start." H.R. REP. No. 595, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6141. 
47. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concuning); 
United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
48. Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 699 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986). 
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debtor's prospects of achieving a viable reorganization. Unable to 
reorganize, some corporations may be forced to liquidate in bankruptcy 
or dissolve under state law. As a result, the debtor's assets will be 
unavailable for environmental cleanup because the liability is not yet a 
claim entitled to pro rata payment.49 
A third problem with the legal relationship test is that creditors may 
manipulate the timing of their claims to obtain the most desirable 
treatment of their claim. In a chapter 7 liquidation, a creditor will not 
delay because only creditors with prepetition claims will share in the 
distribution of estate assets. In a chapter 11 reorganization, however, a 
creditor may choose to delay in order to obtain a postpetition claim 
which is not discharged in the bankruptcy and which may be pursued 
against the reorganized company. Allowing creditors to manipulate the 
classification of their environmental claims by delaying cleanup or 
investigation is in contravention of congressional intent in enacting 
CERCLA, which was to allow the government to remedy environmental 
hazards speedily. 
Many courts and commentators have criticized the legal relationship 
reasoning.50 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,51 retreating 
from a strict interpretation of the "legal relationship" test, recognized 
that "a party may have a bankruptcy claim and not possess a cause of 
action on that claim."52 However, the court maintained that any 
interest cognizable under the Code must stem from "a legal relationship 
relevant to the purported interest from which that interest may flow."53 
49. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002, 1005. 
50. E.g., Erti v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (In re Baldwin-United Corp. 
Litig.), 765 F.2d 343, 348 n.4 (2d. Cir. 1985); In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 
397, 405 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that it is immaterial in bankruptcy whether a claim 
is ripe for adjudication under nonbankruptcy law as long as all the elements that give 
rise to liability under nonbankruptcy law have occurred); Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg 
(In re Grynberg), 113 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (finding that the bankruptcy 
definition of "claim" is not inextricably linked to the accrual of a cause of action under 
state law); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
( concluding that a prepetition claim may encompass a cause of action that is not 
cognizable under nonbankruptcy law until after the bankruptcy has commenced). Contra 
Philippe J. Kahn, Comment, Bankruptcy Versus Environmental Protection: Discharging 
Future CERCLA Liability in Chapter Il, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2054 (1993) 
(recommending that a CERCLA "claim" arises at the time the CERCLA cause of action 
fully accrues and that the CERCLA "claim" be handled through settlement provisions 
in CERCLA rather than through a bankruptcy reorganization). 
51. Kilbarr Corp. v. General Servs. Admin. (In re Remington Rand Corp.), 836 
F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1988). 
52. Id. at 832. 
53. Id. 
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B. The Debtors Conduct Test 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit54 and other courts55 
have considered the debtor's conduct in making the determination of 
when a claim arises. Under the debtor's conduct test, the determination 
of when a claim arises is based on the timing of the debtor's actions that 
gave rise to the claim. The debtor's conduct, rather than the legal 
relationship between parties, can transform a nondischargeable 
postpetition claim under the legal relationship test into a dischargeable 
prepetition claim under the debtor's conduct test. 
In the case of In re Chateaugay Corp.,56 the EPA sought their post-
confirmation costs for cleanup of the debtor's prepetition releases of 
hazardous waste to be considered outside the Code's definition of 
"claim" so that the claim would not be discharged in the chapter 11 
bankruptcy and the EPA could pursue the reorganized company. The 
court affirmed the district court's decision that "an obligation to 
reimburse [the] EPA for response costs is a dischargeable claim 
whenever based upon a pre-petition release or threatened release of 
hazardous substances . . . even though [prepetition releases] have not 
then been discovered by [the] EPA (or anyone else)."57 The Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that "before a contingent 
claim can be discharged, it must result from pre-petition conduct 
[resulting in a release or threatened release] fairly giving rise to that 
54. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
55. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir.) (holding that a claim 
arises when a tortious act or breach of warranty occurs prepetition), cert. dismissed sub 
nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co., 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); Danzig Claimants v. Grynberg 
(In re Grynberg), 113 B.R. 709, 713 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (explaining that the 
triggering act which constitutes the basis for the cause of action must have occurred 
prepetition); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(stating that in determining when a claim arises the focus should be on the timing of the 
debtor's acts which give rise to the claim); Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 
699 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (recognizing an unmatured and contingent claim even 
though the injury was undiscovered by the victim because a relationship existed between 
tortfeasor and victim based on contact at the time of the tortious act and the consequen-
tial potential tort liability). 
56. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). 
57. Id. at 1000. 
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contingent claim."58 The court explained that the "relationship between 
environmental regulating agencies and those subject to regulation 
provides sufficient 'contemplation' of contingencies to bring most 
ultimately maturing payment obligations based on pre-petition conduct 
within the definition of 'claims."'59 The court characterized the EPA's 
claim as contingent rather than determining it to be outside the Code's 
definition of claim. All prepetition environmental liability was 
discharged in the debtor's bankruptcy. 
Many courts and commentators agree that a "relationship" must exist 
between a creditor and a debtor in order to lay a foundation for a claim 
in bankruptcy.60 The Chateaugay decision has been criticized because 
it broadens the concept of relationship to a point which undermines the 
rationale for considering whether a relationship exists, namely that a 
creditor with a relationship may anticipate its potential claim.61 One 
commentator has argued: "Despite Congress's repeal of the 'provability' 
requirement and its broad definition of 'claim,' nothing in the legislative 
history or the Code suggests that Congress intended to discharge a 
creditor's rights before the creditor knew or should have known that its 
rights existed."62 
The creditor's knowledge of the potential claim is an important factor 
to consider in applying the debtor's conduct test. Some courts 
considering the debtor's conduct test are presented with the issue of 
whether a creditor is precluded from pursuing a claim against a debtor 
because the debtor is protected by the automatic stay provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code.63 In these cases, the creditor is well aware of its 
rights against the debtor and is seeking redress. However, other courts, 
presented with the issue of the dischargeability of contingent claims, 
encounter difficult issues regarding to what · extent, if any, a creditor 
must have knowledge or notice of ,contingent liability for the debtor to 
be discharged from that liability.64 In Chateaugay, the court discharged 
58. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 112 B.R. 513, 521 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added), ajf'd, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). 
59. Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005. 
60. E.g., Pettibone Corp. v. Ramirez (In re Pettibone Corp.), 90 B.R. 918, 931-33 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 699 (Bankr. M.D. 
Tenn. 1986). 
61. E.g., Kevin J. Saville, Note, Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: 
When Does a Claim Arise?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 327, 353 (1991). 
62. Id. at 349. 
63. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). 
64. Shawn F. Sullivan, Note, Discharge of CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: The 
Necessity for a Uniform Position, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445 (1993) (discussing the 
due process requirements associated with discharging CERCLA claims in a chapter 11 
reorganization). See infra part III.D for a discussion of dischargeability. 
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the debtor because the debtor and creditor were well aware of each 
other. The debtor was aware of its contingent environmental liability 
and scheduled the government agency as a creditor; the creditor received 
notice of the bankruptcy and filed a proof of claim. The creditor had an 
opportunity to anticipate its potential claims based on its prepetition 
regulatory relationship with the debtor.65 
C. The Fair Contemplation Test 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit66 and other courts67 have 
considered whether liability resulting from the debtor's conduct was or 
could have been fairly contemplated by the parties in determining 
whether a claim is dischargeable. If liability was, or should have been, 
fairly contemplated by the parties prepetition, it gives rise to a 
prepetition claim which may be discharged in bankruptcy. These courts 
combine the separate issues of when a claim arises and whether the 
claim may be discharged into a single inquiry. 
In In re Jensen, the Ninth Circuit held that where the state had 
sufficient knowledge of the debtors' potential liability for cleanup costs 
before the debtors filed their bankruptcy petition, the state's contingent 
claim was discharged.68 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
in In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Paci.fie Railroad Co.,69 
although not expressly adopting the fair contemplation test, explained: 
[W]hen a potential CERCLA claimant can tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known 
release of a hazardous substance which this potential claimant knows will lead 
65'. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d 
Cir. 1991). 
66. California Dep't of Health Servs. v. Jensen (In re Jensen), 995 F.2d 925 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
67. In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that a prepetition claim existed where the claimant knew there had been a 
release, response costs were imminent, and liability was tied to the debtor); Am Int'l, 
Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 146 B.R. 391 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (although not adopting the fair 
contemplation test per se, following the magistrate judge's recommended holding that 
a contingent claim arises when a release occurs and is dischargeable if it was within the 
fair contemplation of the parties at the time of the bankruptcy filing); In re National 
Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (finding that the debtor's liability or 
response costs associated with prepetition activity gave rise to a dischargeable claim to 
the extent that such claims could fairly be contemplated by the parties at the time of 
commencement of the case). 
68. Jensen, 995 F.2d at 931. 
69. 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992) 
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to CERCLA response costs, and when this potential claimant has, in fact, 
conducted tests with regard to this contamination problem, then this potential 
claimant has, at least, a contingent CERCLA claim .... 70 · 
In that case the prepetition claim was discharged and the claimant was 
not allowed to pursue the reorganized debtor. 
The In re National Gypsum Co. 71 court identified factors relevant to 
the inquiry of fair contemplation by the parties. These factors are 
"knowledge by the parties of a site in which a PRP may be liable, [a 
National Priorities List] listing, notification by [the] EPA of PRP 
liability, commencement of investigation and cleanup activities, and 
incurrence of response costs."72 That court considered the debtor's 
conduct test applied in Chateaugay so broad a definition of claim as to 
encompass costs that could not fairly have been contemplated by the 
EPA or the debtor prepetition.73 Those claims not fairly contemplated 
by the parties should not be discharged. 
The fair contemplation test is inconsistent with the language of both 
the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA. A claim is based on a right to 
payment. In order to establish a claim, there is no requirement in the 
Code that the parties have fairly contemplated liability at the time of the 
bankruptcy. Although Congress has not defined "contingent" in the 
Code, some courts and commentators have found that a contingent claim 
for bankruptcy purposes ·exists when the liability-triggering event is 
"reasonably contemplated by the debtor and creditor at the time the 
event giving rise to the claim occurred."74 However, the dictionary 
definition of "contingent liability" is a liability which "is not now fixed 
and absolute, but which will become so in 
case of the occurrence of some future and uncertain event."75 Using 
this definition, fair contemplation, or foreseeability, is not necessary to 
establish a contingent claim. A contingent claim arises under CERCLA 
if the acts giving rise to a need for environmental cleanup occur 
prepetition. Under these circumstances, the government has a prepetition 
right to relief which carries with it an alternative right to payment, even 
though it is contingent on the government expending money. Neither 
70. Id. at 786. 
71. 139 B.R. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1992). 
72. Id. at 408. 
73. Id. 
74. In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), 
ajf'd sub nom. All Media Properties, Inc. v. Best (In re All Media Properties, Inc.), 646 
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 
944 F.2d 997, 1004 (2d Cir. 1991); Saville, supra note 61, at 362 (arguing that if 
environmental liability is "foreseeable," it should be discharged; if it is not, it should 
remain with the debtor). 
75. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 321 (6th ed. 1990), 
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the timing nor the foreseeability of the government's cleanup expendi-
tures should be a factor in determining whether there is a claim. 
Nothing in either CERCLA or the Bankruptcy Code supports such a 
proposition. 76 
CERCLA imposes liability on property owners when there is a release 
of a hazardous substance on their property-whether or not the owner 
is at fault or is even aware of the release. The debtor's liability for 
repayment of the EPA's remediation costs does not depend on whether 
or not the EPA or the property owner fairly contemplated, at any time, 
that the EPA would need to take action to remediate the property in the 
future. A contingent claim arises in bankruptcy when contingent liability 
arises under nonbankruptcy law. Contingent liability under CERCLA 
arises when the debtor's conduct results in the release or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance. At that time the property owner's 
liability is contingent only upon the EPA taking steps to remedy the 
environmental hazard. The debtor need not take any further action for 
a cause of action to accrue under CERCLA in the future. 
Although foreseeability is not a factor in establishing a contingent 
claim in bankruptcy, one must consider separately the issue of whether 
foreseeability is a factor in the dischargeability of a contingent claim in 
bankruptcy. No provision in the Code explicitly requires that a 
prepetition liability be "fairly contemplated" by the parties in order to be 
discharged. No explicit exception to discharge exists in the Bankruptcy 
Code for prepetition contingent environmental claims. Unless prepetition 
environmental claims fall within an e,:cception to discharge, they should 
be discharged. 
- Only. one exception to discharge, section 523(a)(3)(A),77 may be 
applicable. If an individual debtor fails to list or schedule a claim in 
time for the creditor to :file a proof of claim, the creditor's claim will not 
be discharged unless the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the 
case in time to file a claim. This exception assures that creditors will 
have an opportunity to share in the distribution of the estate assets. If 
the debt is neither listed nor scheduled and the creditor has no notice, 
76. Heidt, supra note 22, at 179. 
77. "A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt- . . . 
(3) neither listed nor scheduled ... in 
time to permit - (A) ... timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had 
notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing .... " 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(3)(A) (1988). 
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the creditor cannot file a claim and share in the distribution of estate 
assets. 
In general, if notice and participation cannot be provided to· a creditor 
holding an unknown future claim, that creditor's due process rights may 
limit the court's ability to discharge a debtor's prepetition claims.78 
One court has required that the claimant have had notice of the debtor's 
potential liability in time to file a proof of claim in order for the 
environmental claim to be discharged. 79 The Seventh Circuit recog-
nized this problem in In re UNR Industries, Inc. 80 The court stated that 
"[t]he practical difficulties of identifying, giving constitutionally 
adequate notice to, and attempting to estimate the damages of [unknown 
future claimants] are formidable, and possibly insurmountable."81 
However, this potential limitation on the dischargeability of prepetition 
contingent claims is not based on the concept of "claim" or of 
"dischargeability," but instead on the claimant's due process rights. 
Even if a claimant is given notice, the notice may not be constitution-
ally sufficient if it does not provide sufficient details regarding the 
claim. 82 On the other hand, due process may require no more than the 
best possible notice under the circumstances.83 One problem with the 
fair contemplation test, which requires that contingent liability be fairly 
contemplated by the parties, is that it is more stringent than the 
requirements imposed by due process. Providing a creditor with proper 
notice may satisfy due process requirements, but such notice cannot 
substitute for the parties' fair contemplation of contingent liability 
prepetition. Bankruptcy, environmental, and constitutional laws do not 
justify imposing the stricter requirement of the fair contemplation test. 
Another problem with the fair contemplation test, like the legal 
relationship test, is that it encourages "dilatory tactics" on the part of the 
creditor. The incentive is for the ci:editor to strategize on when to act 
in order to avoid dischargeability of environmental claims in bankruptcy. 
If the creditor acts after the bankruptcy is filed rather than before, the 
claim may not be considered "in the fair contemplation" of the parties. 
78. Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690,692 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986). See 
generally Sullivan, supra note 64; Kahn, supra note 50, at 2034. 
79. Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648, 653 (D. Minn. 
1991) (holding that "[w]hen the debtor has not disclosed its- potential CERCLA ... 
liabilities in long-since closed bankruptcy proceedings, and the governmental agency has 
not had actual knowledge of the potential claim in sufficient time to file a claim in those 
proceedings, the potential CERCLA . . . liability is not discharged"). 
80. 725 F.2d 1111, 1119 (7th Cir. 1984). 
81. Id. 
82. Saville, supra note 61, at 350. 
83. Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 692 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) 
(citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). 
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Similarly, the debtor may simply notify the creditor of potential liability 
prior to filing bankruptcy in order to assure the creditor's prepetition 
"fair contemplation." This is inapposite to the congressional intent of 
CERCLA to facilitate immediate cleanup because it will unduly burden 
the government with unnecessary investigations which will delay 
environmental cleanups of the most seriously contaminated properties. 
D. Picking. the "Right" Test: When a Claim Arises and When a 
Claim is Discharged · 
The Bankruptcy Code has no separate provision defining an "environ-
mental claim." The intent of section 101(5) is that "claim" be 
interpreted broadly, encompassing contingent, unmatured, unliquidated 
and disputed claims based on state or federal nonbankruptcy law 
resulting from the debtor's prepetition conduct.84 When Congress 
enacted this revision of the Bankruptcy Code, it broadened the definition 
of "claim" to encompass all types of liability incurred by the debtor 
within the bankruptcy case. Therefore, an "environmental claim" should 
fall within the general definition of "claim" provided in section 101(5) 
of the Code85 and should not be treated separately or specially. 
The Bankruptcy Code does not specify when a claim arises and courts 
have struggled with this determination. The legal relationship test 
cannot be supported because it excludes contingent and unmatured 
claims from bankruptcy, in direct conflict with the Bankruptcy Code and 
congressional intent, and encourages creditors to exercise dilatory tactics 
to achieve preferential treatment of their claims. The fact that cleanup 
takes place after the date of relief should have no effect on the 
classification of the claim to recover cleanup expenses. Similarly, the 
fair contemplation test cannot be supported. The fair contemplation test 
can be viewed either as narrowing the definition of "claim" to include 
only environmental liability fairly contemplated by the parties or as 
excepting from discharge any environmental claim not fairly contemplat-
ed by the parties. Either view is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code 
and environmental law. 
84. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended a broad definition of 
"claim." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08. 
85. 11 u.s.c. § 101(5) (1988). 
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The debtor's conduct test is consistent with both bankruptcy and 
environmental law. A claim arises when prepetition conduct by the 
debtor results in the release or threatened release of a hazardous 
substance into the environment. 86 Under CERCLA, contingent liability 
exists when a hazardous environmental condition exists, regardless of 
fault, knowledge, or fair contemplation of such liability, until the 
government takes some form of cleanup action.87 The bankruptcy court 
should not exclude contingent . claims because they are not fairly 
contemplated by the parties when this contingent liability exists outside 
of bankruptcy. 
The National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC), an organization devoted 
to defining what reforms should be made to the Bankruptcy Code, has 
proposed a rule that considers the debtor's conduct in determining when 
an environmental claim arises.88 According to the NBC, environmental 
claims should be treated just as any other claim. A prepetition 
environmental claim, like any other prepetition claim, should be 
discharged unless it falls within an exception to discharge provided in 
the Code. 
The conflict between environmental policies and bankruptcy policies 
is particularly clear when considering the discharge of a debtor's 
environmental liability. Although no exception to discharge of 
environmental liability exists in the Code, expeditious and effective 
cleanup of hazardous substances is an important environmental objective 
which may justify the creation of a new exception. Congress bears the 
burden of weighing competing policies and establishing this exception 
to discharge through legislation. If an exception to discharge is 
desirable based on environmental policies, Congress should modify the 
Bankruptcy Code to incorporate such an exception. Bankruptcy courts 
confronted with environmental claims should not modify existing 
priorities, established both inside and outside of bankruptcy law, by 
redefining the meaning of "claim" and by creating nonstatutory 
exceptions to discharge, in order to satisfy environmental objectives. 
86. See id. 
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c) (1988). 
88. "A claim against a debtor for environmental harm should be regarded as 
arising (A) When the debtor first (1) acts, resulting in, (2) fails to act, resulting in, or 
(3) otherwise becomes legally responsible for the harm, (B) irrespective of when the 
harm (1) occurs, (2) is manifested, (3) is fully known or knowable, or (4) is remediated." 
ALI-ABA Conference, Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1993, A Presentation of the NBC's 
Bankruptcy Code Review Project, June 10-12, 1993 at Atlanta, GA, at 4-5 [hereinafter 
Bankruptcy Reform]. 
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IV. ABANDONMENT 
The treatment of environmental claims in bankruptcy is controversial 
because of the competing policies of environmental and bankruptcy law. 
When a party responsible for environmental damage seeks relief in 
bankruptcy, the question is who must bear the cost of environmental 
remediation. If the environmental liability gives rise to a prepetition 
claim, the government will bear the burden of a majority of the cleanup 
costs because the bankruptcy estate will only pay the EPA on a pro rata 
basis with other unsecured creditors. However, if the environmental 
claim arose postpetition and qualifies as an administrative expense, the 
bankruptcy estate will bear the burden of paying the cleanup costs to the 
extent funds are available because the claim will be paid from estate 
assets, in full, ahead of unsecured creditors. 
In determining whether an environmental claim should be entitled to 
administrative priority, some courts consider the trustee's power to 
abandon89 the property relevant. The abandonment of property subject 
to environmental liability is interpreted as a question of environmental 
claim priority cast in a slightly different form. These courts hold that 
a bankruptcy court cannot authorize a trustee to abandon property 
without requiring the trustee to first clean up the property or reimburse 
others for the cleanup costs.90 The result of denying abandonment is 
the prioritization of the environmental claim ahead of all other unsecured 
claims because the funds used to satisfy the environmental claim would 
otherwise be available to pay unsecured creditors. Thus, the decisions 
of these courts regarding abandonment of property are in fact decisions 
establishing environmental claim priority.91 
These courts do not adequately distinguish between the issues of 
abandonment and environmental claim priority. Abandonment and 
environmental claim priority are distinct issues. The abandonment issue 
requires a determination of the conditions under which a trustee may 
avoid the future liability associated with continued ownership or 
89. The Bankruptcy Code provides: "After notice and a hearing, the trustee may 
abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of 
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). 
90. See part V.A for a discussion of the role of abandonment in determining 
administrative priority and an analysis of the conflicting case law. 
91. Jackson, supra note 15, at 12. 
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operation of property in the bankruptcy estate. The claim priority issue 
requires a determination of whether a creditor's environmental claim is 
secured or unsecured, prepetition or postpetition, and necessary to 
preserve the estate. Based on these factors, the bankruptcy court decides 
the portion of estate assets to which the creditor is entitled. Treatment 
of environmental claims is discussed in part V. 
Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee to abandon 
property that is "burdensome" or of "inconsequential value and benefit" 
to the bankruptcy estate.92 By abandoning burdensome property, the 
trustee may expend estate resources in liquidating only those assets 
which have a net value to the estate. Abandonment benefits the estate 
by freeing the estate from obligations that have not yet arisen but might 
arise if the trustee remains the property owner during bankruptcy.93 A 
trustee who abandons burdensome property prevents the bankruptcy 
estate from incurring postpetition liability associated with ownership of 
the property. 
Courts disagree on the conditions under which a trustee may abandon 
property subject to environmental liability.94 Part of the reason for 
disagreement is due to the misperception that When a trustee abandons 
burdensome property, the trustee also abandons the debtor's liability for 
environmental cleanup of the property. The trustee may abandon the 
property, but not the debtor's prepetition liability incurred as a conse-
quence of owning the property prepetition. The trustee's decision to 
keep or abandon burdensome property does not affect that liability and 
abandonment does not relieve the trustee from responsibility for the 
debtor's prepetition liabilities. 
A. The Midlantic Decision 
Although the trustee's abandonment power is unconditional as defined 
in section 554 of the Code, the Supreme Court has restricted that power 
when the property in question is subject to environmental liability. In 
the landmark case of Mid/antic National Bank v. New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection,95 . the Supreme Court considered a 
trustee's power to abandon property containing toxic waste. In that case, 
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste oil at two 
92. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a), (b) (1988). 
93. Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring 1987, at 173. 
94. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
95. 474 U.S. 494 (1986). 
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facilities located in New York and New Jersey.96 Investigations 
revealed that Quanta accepted more than 470,000 gallons of oil 
contaminated with PCB, a toxic carcinogen, at the two sites.97 Quanta 
filed a chapter 11 petition for reorganization during negotiations for 
cleanup of the New Jersey site and converted to chapter 7 liquidation 
after receiving a cleanup order.98 
The.bankruptcy court approved the trustee's abandonment of the New 
York facility and the contaminated oil at the New Jersey site.99 The 
trustee removed the guard service and shut down the fire-suppression 
system. The bankruptcy court did not require the trustee to take steps 
to reduce imminent danger although 470,000 gallons of highly toxic 
waste oil in unguarded, deteriorating containers presented risks of 
explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural 
resources, and injury, genetic damage, or death through personal 
contact.100 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the 
bankruptcy court's decisions. 101 
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decisions and 
refused to allow the trustee to abandon the contaminated properties. The 
Supreme Court found the trustee's abandonment "aggravated already 
existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, 
vandalism, and fire." 102 Although section 554(a) allows a trustee to 
abandon property which is burdensome or of inconsequential value, the 
Supreme Court created a narrow exception and refused to allow 
abandonment. The Supreme Court concluded: 
Congress did not intend for§ 554(a) to pre-empt all state and local laws. The 
Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an abandonment 
without formulating conditions that will adequately protect the public's health 
and safety. Accordingly, without reaching the question whether certain state 
laws imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to interfere 
with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, [the Court] hold[s] that a trustee may 
not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is 
96. Id. at 494. 
97. Id. at 496-97. 
98. Id. at 497. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 499 n.3. 
101. City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.), 
739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
102. Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 499 n.3. 
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reasonab1¥ designed to protect the public health or safety from identified 
hazards. 1 
The Court further stated: 
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by § 554 is a 
narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future 
violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment 
power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to 
protect the public health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm. 104 
The Court has carved out a narrow exception to abandonment with the 
Mid/antic decision. However, several problems cloud the Mid/antic 
decision, making it difficult for trial courts to interpret and apply.105 
One commentator explains: 
First, [Mid/antic] was endorsed by only a bare majority of justices. 106 
Second, the Court expressly declined to attach a priority to claims for cleanup 
expenses. 107 Thus, while [Mid/antic] precludes a trustee from abandoning 
property without first bringing it into compliance with state environmental laws, 
Mid/antic gives no guidance concerning the source of the cleanup funds. Third, 
the limitations placed on abandonment power are uncertain; 108 the Court 
stated that the limitation is too narrow to include instances in which con-
tamination is merely speculative or where no "imminent and identifiable" harm 
to the public is present. 109 
Furthermore, the Midlantic exception does not apply to environmental 
laws not reasonably calculated to protect the public health and safe-
ty. 110 The Court did not provide guidance regarding what circumstanc-
es constitute "imminent danger" or what laws "reasonably" protect the 
public from that danger. 
B. Application of the Midlantic Decision 
The Midlantic decision presents, trial courts with the difficult task of 
formulating a test to determine whether a trustee's act of abandonment 
is in contravention of state or federal law .. Some courts, interpreting the 
Midlantic decision narrowly, find that a trustee may abandon contami-
103. Id. at 506-07. 
104. Id. at 507 n.9. 
105. Paula T. Perkins, Comment, Abandonment in the Face of Possible Toxic 
Contamination: What's a Lender To Do?, 44 SW. L.J. 1563, 1575-76 (1991); Richard 
A. Marshack, The Toxic Claim: Using Bankruptcy Law To Limit Environmental 
Liabilities, 19 CAL. BANKR. J. 193, 199 (1991). 
106. The Midlantic opinion was a 5-4 decision. 
107. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498 n.2. 
108. Id. at 507 n.9. 
109. Perkins, supra note 105, at 1575-76 (quoting Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494, 507 
n.9). 
110. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507. 
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nated property if the trustee takes adequate rirecautions to ensure that 
there is no imminent danger to the public. 1 1 These courts focus on 
the act of abandonment and rely on the plain language of both the statute 
and the opinion. Other courts, interpreting the Midlantic decision 
broadly, find that a trustee is barred from abandoning any property if the 
act of abandonment would violate a state or federal law designed to 
protect the public health and safety.112 These courts hold that the 
trustee must comply with environmental law and the costs of compliance 
are entitled to administrative priority. This interpretation of the 
Mid/antic decision prevents abandonment of property which is not in full 
compliance with state and federal environmental law. These courts focus 
on the condition of the property and emphasize the greater importance 
of environmental policies over bankruptcy objectives. 
The Supreme Court's dicta in Ohio v. Kovacs, 113 which was decided 
one year before Mid/antic, provides some guidance in understanding the 
Court's Mid/antic decision. Kovacs involved a debtor who filed a 
chapter 11 bankruptcy which was later converted to chapter 7. A 
receiver had been put in charge of the debtor's property. The Court 
provided dicta regarding the requirements for the debtor to abandon the 
property had he been in control of the property instead of the receiver. 
The Court stated: 
If the site at issue were [the debtor's] property, the trustee would shortly 
determine whether it was of value to the estate. If the property was worth more 
than the cost of bringing it into compliance with state [ environmental] law, the 
trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net value, and the buyer would clean 
up the property, in which event whatever obligation [the debtor] might have had 
to clean up the property would have been satisfied. If the property were worth 
less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee would likely abandon it to its prior 
owner, who would have to comply with the state environmental law to the 
extent of his or its ability. 114 
111. E.g., Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 
856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991); In 
re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 119 B.R. 45 (D.N.J. 1990); In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1986); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). 
112. E.g., United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997 (2d 
Cir. 1991); Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118 
(6th Cir. 1987); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987); In re Microfab, Inc., 105 
B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 1987). 
113. 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
114. Id. at 284 n.12. 
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From this passage it appears that a trustee may abandon property subject 
to environmental liability in violation of state environmental law. The 
Court indicated that the estate may avoid liability by abandoning the 
property and that the party receiving the property must comply with 
environmental law only to the extent of his or its ability. 
1. Interpretation o/Midlantic in Abandonment Cases 
Some courts considering environmental liability in bankruptcy have 
been presented with the issue of whether a trustee may abandon property 
subject to environmental liability.115 These courts interpret Mid/antic 
narrowly. Most of them authorize abandonment. They distinguish the 
facts in each particular case from Midlaritic s facts and hold that the 
narrow exception carved out by the Supreme Court does not apply. 
For example, in the case of In re Oklahoma Refining Co.,116 the 
trustee sought court approval to abandon the property. State. laws 
required that before a contaminated site may be abandoned the owner 
must clean up the property, commit to monitor the site for up to thirty 
years, and provide financial assurances. The trustee had no estate funds 
available to comply. The bankruptcy court allowed the trustee to 
abandon the property even though abandonment would not be in strict 
compliance with state environmental laws. The court, factually 
distinguishing the case from Midlantic, found that there was no 
imminent harm to the public, that abandonment would not aggravate the 
existing situation, that the refinery was largely in compliance with state 
115. E.g., Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Farg9 Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 
856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 119 B.R. 45 (D.N.J. 
1990); In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991); In re Better-Brite 
Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989); In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 1989); In re 82 Milbar Boulevard, Inc., 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988); 
In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In re Mowbray Eng'g 
Co., 67 
B.R. 34 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. 
Okla. 1986). 
116. 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). After the debtor filed bankruptcy, the 
chapter 11 trustee ceased all operations at the debtor's oil refinery site. Id. at 563. 
During prepetition refinery operations hazardous substances had been dumped on the 
property. Id. Although toxic substances were found on the site, none were found in the 
public water supply. There was no imminent harm to the public health although it was 
likely that at some indeterminable time, toxic substances would pollute the public water 
supply. Id. at 563-64. The trustee took substantial steps to minimize hazards by drilling 
monitoring wells, removing hazardous waste, draining tanks, maintaining fencing, and 
commissioning an environmental report. Id. at 564. The cost of cleanup was estimated 
at $2.5 million and the property would then be worth only $100,000. Id. 
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agency directives, and that there were no estate funds available to 
comply fully. 117 
In the case of In re Franklin Signal Corp., 118 the bankruptcy court 
held that a trustee may abandon contaminated property if the trustee 
takes adequate precautionary measures to ensure that there is no 
imminent danger to the public. " 9 Specifically, the court stated that at 
a minimum the trustee must conduct an investigation to determine what 
hazardous substances, if any, burden the property and the trustee must 
inform state and federal agencies of the situation, including the trustee's 
intent to abandon. 120 
The court proposed five factors121 to be considered in determining 
whether a bankruptcy court may approve of abandonment of contaminat-
ed property. Applying this test, the court approved abandonment, even 
though abandonment by the trustee would be in violation of state laws 
designed to protect the public health and safety, because there was no 
evidence of any imminent danger to the public, the amount of waste was 
relatively small, and the estate did not have sufficient funds to dispose 
of the waste. 122 
In the case of In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 123 a chapter 11 corporate 
debtor desired to abandon a fertilizer plant, which was the only piece of 
property left in the estate. The bankruptcy court found that the property 
was in violation of state law but that the violations did not present any 
imminent harm or danger to the public. The court authorized uncondi-
tional abandonment because there were no unencumbered assets to fund 
117. Id. at 565. 
118. 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986). Franklin Signal Corporation leased 
property for manufacturing purposes. Fourteen drums, totalling 400 gallons, of 
contaminated waste were generated and stored on the property before the debtor filed 
bankruptcy under chapter 11. Id. at 269, 274 .. The case was converted to chapter 7 five 
months later. The trustee filed a 
motion to abandon the waste or, in the alternative, to determine how the cleanup would 
be funded. Id. 
119. Id. at 272. 
120. Id. at 273. 
121. The factors considered were: "( 1) the imminence of danger to the public health 
and safety, (2) the extent of probable harm, (3) the amount and type of hazardous waste, 
(4) the cost to bring the property into compliance with environmental laws, and (5) the 
amount and type of funds available for cleanup." Id. at 272. 
122. Id. at 273. 
123. Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 
F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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the cleanup and the environmental violations posed no imminent harm 
or danger to the public. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed unconditional abandonment based on the estate's lack of 
unencumbered assets and the absence of imminent public harm.124 
While it was not an issue in this case because the estate had no 
unencumbered funds, the court stated in dicta that "where the estate has 
unencumbered assets, the bankruptcy court should require stricter 
compliance with state environmental law before abandonment is 
permitted."125 
In the case of In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 126 the district court 
distinguished the facts before it from those in Midlantic and allowed 
abandonment. 127 In Ferrante, no funds were available to correct 
environmental hazards.128 The debtor in Ferrante filed a chapter 7 
liquidation, while in Midlantic the debtor filed a chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion and converted to charter 7 only after the state sought compliance 
with environmental laws. 29 In Ferrante, the public was adequately 
protected, and abandonment of the system would not aggravate already 
existing dangers.130 The customers had been warned of the contamina-
tion and were able to refrain from using the water and the debtor's 
operations had ceased long before the bankruptcy. 131 Further, the state 
agency waited nearly eight years before seeking to enforce orders issued 
against the debtor and pursued judicial remedies only after learning of 
the trustee's intended abandonment.132 The system did not pose an 
imminent threat of harm to the fublic, and the state agency's interest 
was in protecting the public :fisc. 33 
In the case of In re Shore Co., 134 the district court affirmed the 
124. Id. at 16. 
125. Id. at 17. 
126. 119 B.R. 45 (D.N.J. 1990). The debtor owned a public water supply system. 
The system was contaminated and a state agency issued a series of orders directing the 
debtor to correct system deficiencies. Most were unremedied. Id. at 46. · In April of 
1986 the debtor abandoned the system. Id. In April of 1987, the debtor filed a petition 
to liquidate under chapter 7. The trustee sought authorization to abandon the system and 
a state agency sought a court order compelling the trustee to operate the system in 
compliance with state law. Id. 
127. Id. at 50. 
128. Id. at 49 n.8. 
129. Id. at 48. 
130. Id. at 50. 
131. Id. at 49, 50. 
132. Id. at 50. 
133. Id. 
134. 134 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991). The Shore Corporation operated an 
oil refinery, discharging waste into the ground water and storing harmful materials in pits 
on refinery property. Id. at 575. Shore filed a chapter 11 petition but six months later, 
after an unsuccessful attempt to reorganize, the case was converted to chapter 7. Id. at 
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bankruptcy court's decision and authorized abandonment, holding that 
a trustee's right to abandon environmentally impacted property is limited 
only by the precondition that the trustee remediate any imminent and 
identifiable danger. 135 The court found that, unlike the Mid/antic case, 
abandonment would not aggravate potential harm to the public because 
the property had in fact been abandoned for almost a decade. 136 The 
court explained that although "in all likelihood" the property was in 
violation of environmental law, violation of environmental laws is not 
enough to limit the trustee's power of abandonment, nor is the recogni-
tion that a site probably contains some hazardous substances suffi-
cient. 137 The violation must constitute an imminent and identifiable 
harm. 138 The court determined that there was no imminent and 
identifiable harm. 139 
In the case of In re FCX, Inc., 140 the court found that the presence 
of five tons of buried pesticide in an uncontrolled condition on the 
debtor's property constituted an imminent and identifiable harm to those 
living in the area. 141 The court granted administrative expense status 
to "only those costs reasonably required to remove the immediate 
threat."142 The court authorized abandonment "on the condition that 
573. The trustee attempted to sell the refinery and commissioned a closure study to 
determine the cost of cleanup for the purpose of making the property more attractive to 
buyers. Id. at 573-74. However, funds to clean up were not allocated and efforts to sell 
the property were unsuccessful. Id. at 574. After four years in chapter 7, a newly-
appointed chapter 7 trustee decided to abandon the property. Id. 
135. Id. at 578. 
136. Id. at 579. 
137. Id. at 578. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. 96 B.R. 49 (Bania. E.D.N.C. 1989). FCX, Inc. operated a pesticide blending 
plant from 1940 to 1969. Id. at 51. In 1969, FCX buried five tons of "off spec" 
pesticides in a pit at an indeterminate location on the plant site. Id. In addition, FCX 
buried 50 to 100 gallons of liquid DDT in glass bottles. Id. at 52. FCX also routinely 
disposed of another chemical, Lindane, by pouring it directly on ground soil. Id. FCX 
filed bankruptcy under chapter 11 in 1985 for the purpose of liquidating its assets and 
distributing them to creditors. Id. at 50. In May 1986, FCX notified the EPA of its 
recently discovered hazardous waste problem. Id. at 51. The estimated remediation 
costs were greater than the value of the property in an uncontaminated condition. Id. 
FCX attempted to abandon the property. Id. 
141. Id. at 55. 
142. Id. 
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[the debtor] set aside the sum of $250,000 for the payment of clean up 
costs incurred by [the] EPA or the State."143 
In each of these cases, the court, when presented with the issue of a 
trustee's power to abandon property subject to environmental liability, 
applied Mid/antic narrowly and determined that the trustee who takes 
adequate precautions to protect the public health and safety may abandon 
environmentally impacted property. The costs associated with taking 
precautionary measures to protect the public against imminent harm are 
incurred postpetition by the bankruptcy estate and therefore qualify for 
treatment as administrative expenses. The National Bankruptcy 
Conference (NBC), has proposed rules for abandonment based on the 
Bankruptcy Code and a narrow interpretation of the Mid/antic deci-
sion.144 
2. Consequences of Abandonment 
When property is abandoned, control of the asset is. reinstated in the 
debtor with all rights and obligations as before the filing of the 
bankruptcy. 145 Title to property abandoned by the estate revests in the 
debtor retroactively to the date of commencement of the case. . The 
result is as if the estate -never owned the property. 146 However, the 
143. Id. 
144. Rules for Abandonment: 
1. A trustee or debtor in possession should have the right to abandon property 
"that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit 
to the estate." 
2. The abandonee of property under section 554 should have a prepetition 
claim for damages, that is, for the net cost of remediation (full cost less 
residual value of the property). . 
3. Property is subject to being abandoned only if as of the date of relief the 
property was legally identifiable as separate from other property of the debtor 
(and had not been previously set off by a transfer subject to any avoiding 
power under the Code). 
4. A trustee or debtor in possession who intends to abandon or sell property 
subject to environmental regulation should be required to protect the public 
from immediate danger by (1) promptly giving to a public authority or 
authorities responsible for the regulation notice of the immediate danger and 
(2) taking steps to forestall- immediate environmental harm until a public 
authority or other responsible entity can assume control of the site. 
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 88, at 24. 
145. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). Abandonment divests the property from the estate. 
Legislative history suggests that the property is abandoned .to the person having a 
possessory interest in the property. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5878; Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 n.12 (1985). 
146. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that "[p]roperty abandoned under [section 554] ceases to be part of the estate[,] 
... reverts to the debtor[,] and stands as ifno bankruptcy petition was filed"), aff'd, 502 
U.S. 410 (1992); see also In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. 
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debtor's assets, if any, are in the bankruptcy estate. The debtor thus is 
in no position to cure environmental violations or reimburse anyone for 
cleanup expenses. 
A rule of law prohibiting abandonment of environmentally burdened 
property does not resolve the problem of environmental cleanup when 
the responsible party has no resources . to fund or reimburse the 
cleanup.147 Although ownership of abandoned property is reinstated 
in the debtor, with respect to continuing violations of state environmental 
laws several parties have an interest in disposing of the waste or 
cleaning up the site, including the debtor, the property owner (if the 
debtor is not the owner), the secured creditors, the state and federal 
governments, the corporate officers and directors, and other PRPs. 148 
If the estate lacks the resources necessary to clean up the contaminated 
property, there are likely third parties (who often oppose the abandon-
ment) who are better situated than the bankruptcy estate to prevent 
potential "imminent and identifiable" harm. In some circumstances 
abandonment may be the only means of achieving the Supreme Court's 
goal of protecting the public from "imminent and identifiable" harm. 149 
For example, in one unusual case, In re 82 Milbar Boulevard, Inc., 150 
the bankruptcy court authorized the conveyance of a possessory interest 
in the contaminated property to the EPA for environmental 
remediation. 151 
Often in cases of abandonment, the court focuses not on the issue of 
public health and safety, but i_nstead on the public fisc, with an interest 
in preventing the government from ]?earing the co.st of environmental 
cleanups. The Ferrante court considered these issues and aptly noted: 
Mich. 1987); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 274 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); 
LaRoche v. Tarpley (In re Tarpley), 4 B.R. 145, 146 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980). 
147. Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 272 n.5. A broad interpretation of Mid/antic 
creates a troublesome dilemma in a chapter 7 no asset bankruptcy. There are no estate 
funds available for the trustee to comply with environmen4tl law. Yet, a bankruptcy 
court will prevent the trustee from abandoning the property without full compliance with 
environmental law. Thus, the trustee is unable to administer burdensome property in the 
estate. However, ultimately the property will be abandoned by default pursuant to 
§ 554(c) which provides for abandonment of all property remaining in the estate when 
the case is closed. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1988). A rule preventing abandonment 
accomplishes nothing under these circumstances. 
148. Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 274; Marshack, supra note 105, at 200. 
149. Marshack, supra note 105, at 200. 
150. 91 B.R. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
151. Id. at 219. 
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"That the State may be forced to bear the expense of remedial measures, 
when that expense should have been borne by [the debtor] before it :filed 
for bankruptcy, is perhaps unfair but nonetheless [is] not a basis for 
restriction of the powers given a trustee under the Bankruptcy 
Code."152 The courts should focus on the issue of public health and 
safety as Mid/antic explains. In matters concerning the public :fisc, it is 
Congress, and not the bankruptcy courts, that has the power to restrict 
the actions of a bankruptcy trustee. This must be done by Congress' 
careful revision of the Bankruptcy Code, not by judicial :fiat. 
In the Mid/antic dissent Justice Rehnquist noted that 
[w]hat the [majority] fails to appreciate is that respondents' interest in these 
cases lies not just in protecting public health and safety but also in protecting 
the public fisc . . . . But barring abandonment and forcing a cleanup would 
effectively place respondents' interest in protecting the public fisc ahead of the 
claims of other creditors. Congress simply did not intend that § 554 abandon-
ment hearings would be used to establish the priority of particular claims in 
bankruptcy. i'3'3 
This led Justice Rehnquist to conclude that "[t]he bankruptcy court may 
not, in the exercise of its equitable powers, enforce its view of sound 
public policy at the expense of the interests the [Bankruptcy] Code is 
designed to protect."154 This reasoning leads to the conclusion that 
public policy grounds should not be used· by a bankruptcy court to 
justify establishing its own set of priorities to further an environmental 
agenda when the Bankruptcy Code and nonbankruptcy law together 
define the priorities to be followed in bankruptcy. 
V. TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS 
Whether or ·not the trustee chooses to abandon burdensome estate 
property, the bankruptcy estate remains liable for prepetition environ-
mental claims incurred by the debtor. Furthermore, the estate may incur 
additional environmental liability based. on postpetition ownership or 
operation of the property. The Bankruptcy Code does not distinguish 
environmental claims from other claims. An environmental claim, like 
most other unsecured claims, should be treated as a general unsecured 
claim unless it is entitled to priority treatment as an administrative 
expense. To maximize the distribution of estate assets to creditors, 
administrative expense claims must be kept to a minimum. Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, to qualify as an administrative expense the expense 
152. In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 119 B.R. 45, 50 (D.N.J. 1990). 
153. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 
516-17 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
154. Id. at 514 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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must arise postpetition and must either rehabilitate or preserve the estate, 
providing a benefit to the estate. 155 The requirement of an actual 
benefit is necessary to protect the limited assets of the estate for the 
benefit of unsecured creditors. 156 The expense must not be incurred 
primarily in the interest of an individual claimant; it must, in· fact, 
benefit the estate and the creditors as a whole. 157 In a liquidation case, 
where there is no reorganization effort, benefit to the estate is particular-
ly important because the emphasis of the bankruptcy is on maximizing 
the size of the estate to be distributed to creditors rather than assuring 
continuing business operations.158 
Although environmental cleanup may be a benefit to society, it may 
not preserve or benefit the bankruptcy estate. When environmental 
155. The Bankruptcy Code provides: "After notice and a hearing, there shall be 
allowed administrative expenses . . . including , . . the actual, necessary costs and 
expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services 
rendered after the commencement of the case[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988) 
(emphasis added). 
Many courts have interpreted this language. E.g., In re Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584 
(7th Cir. 1984) (denying administrative expense priority to an advertiser because the 
claim was based on an irrevocable contract with the debtor which was executed 
prepetition, even though benefits of the contract accrued to the estate postpetition); 
Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950 (1st Cir. 
1976) (holding that to establish administrative expense status, the claimant must show 
that the claim is based on a transaction with the debtor in possession and that the 
transaction resulted in a direct benefit to the estate); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Rea Express, Inc. (In re Rea Express, Inc.), 442 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding, 
in a chapter 11 case, that workmen's compensation payments to employees injured 
prepetition were not entitled to priority as an administrative expense and that sums due 
to employees postpetition were entitled to priority only to the extent that they were 
attributable to events during the pendency of the proceedings); In re CIS Corp., 142 B.R. 
640 (S.D,N.Y. 1992) (holding that a lessor of computer equipment to a chapter 11 debtor 
was not entitled to administrative priority for postpetition rent because the debtor 
subleased the equipment to a third party which had prepaid the entire amount owed 
under the sublease to the debtor prepetition and as a result the sublease conferred no 
postpetition benefit on the debtor's bankruptcy estate); In re Coastal Carriers Corp., 128 
B.R. 400 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991) (stating that owners of a tug which towed the debtor's 
barge three quarters of the way across the Atlantic Ocean before it sank were entitled 
to an administrative expense for payment of a postpetition towage contract and finding 
that the debtor's estate benefited because it was able to function as a going concern and 
to enter into a commercial shipping contract which gave rise to certain rights and 
liabilities). 
156. Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 
F.2d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 1988). 
157. Coastal Carriers, 128 B.R. at 403. 
158. Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 706. 
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cleanup costs exceed the value of the property after cleanup, there is 
clearly no economic benefit to the estate in incurring the cleanup cost. 
Furthermore, treating environmental claims as administrative expenses 
may substantially deplete estate resources and significantly reduce 
unsecured creditors' compensation. The courts have arrived at conflic-
ting treatments of environmental claims due to competing environmental 
and bankruptcy policies and the failure of either bankruptcy law or 
environmental law to authorize expressly priority treatment of environ-
mental claims. 
In one case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered 
the priority of a nuisance claim in In re Chicago, Rock Island & Paci.fie 
Railroad Co. 159 In that case, the debtor was reorganizing but had 
ceased operating its railroad and was liquidating that portion of its 
business. The state sought a court order to compel the debtor to remove 
the debtor's abandoned highway crossings from state property in an 
effort to prevent prospective nuisances. The court held that the state 
would not be entitled to administrative expense priority for costs 
incurred in removing the crossings in the absence of any evidence that 
the removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger. 160 The court 
refused to grant administrative priority to the nuisance claims because 
the benefits to creditors of avoiding potential future liability were too 
slight and conjectural.161 
In sorting out the conflict between environmental law and bankruptcy 
law, some courts have found Kovacs controlling and have refused to rely 
on Mid/antic to determine the proper treatment of environmental claims 
because Mid/antic addressed the issue of abandonment and declined to 
consider the proper treatment of environmental claims. 162 In Kovacs, 
the Supreme Court found that a state injunction directing the cleanup of 
a hazardous waste site was a prepetition "claim" dischargeable against 
the debtor. 163 
For example, the Nirtth Circuit found Kovacs controlling in the case'. 
of In re Dant & Russell, Inc. 164 and determined that the lessor's claim 
159. 756 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1985). 
160. Id. at 520, 523. 
161. Id. at 520. 
• 162. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 
498 n.2 (1986). 
163. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
164. Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 
F.2d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 1988). Dant & Russell, Inc. operated a wood treatment plant on 
leased property. Id. at 701-02. The corporation filed chapter 11 and continued 
operations for over a year to facilitate liquidation. Id. at 702. A stat.e agency discovered 
massive toxic waste contamination at the site resulting primarily from prepetition 
operations by the debtor and debtor's predecessor. Cleanup costs were estimated 
256 
(VOL. 32: 221, 1995] Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
for environmental cleanup costs was a prepetition claim. 165 The court 
properly refused to prioritize the prepetition environmental claim as an 
administrative expense and instead treated it as a general unsecured 
claim. The court explained: 
Congress alone fixes priorities. Courts are not free to formulate their own rules 
of super or sub-priorities within a specifically enumerated class. . . . [U]ntil the 
[state] legislature enacts such protective provision or until Congress amends 
sections 503 and 507 to give priority to claims for [ environmental] cleanup 
costs, [the court is] without authority to create such a priority. 166 . 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found Kovacs 
controlling in the case of Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze 
Co. 167 The Third Circuit held that a prepetition contractual indemnifi-
cation claim was properly treated as a general unsecured claim not 
entitled to administrative priority'. 168 The bankruptcy court had granted 
Southern a lien against the proceeds of the sale of Johnson's manufactur-
ing plant for the cost of cleanup. 169 The Third Circuit explained that, 
in exercising its equitable powers, the bankruptcy court is not free to 
create rights otherwise unavailable under applicable law. 170 State law 
provided no means for placing a lien on the property based on a contract 
indemnification claim and the bankruptcy court refused to create such· a 
lien. · 
Both Dant & Russell anc.lSouthern Railway involved lessees whose 
prepetition conduct resulted in prepetition claims against the bankruptcy 
between $10 and $30 million. Id. The lessor sought administrative expense priority for 
the cleanup costs at the 
site. Id. at 703. 
165. Id. at 709. The court decided that consequential damages arising out of the 
breach of an unexpired lease should be regarded as prepetition. Id. 
166. Id. at 709 ( citation omitted). 
167. 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985). Johnson Bronze Co. (Johnson) conducted 
manufacturing operations and disposed of sewage on an adjacent site owned by Southern 
Railway Co. (Southern) pursuant to a license agreement which provided that Johnson 
would indemnify Southern for any liability arising from its use. Id. at 139. Johnson 
disposed of hazardous waste on Southern's site. Id. A cleanup order was issued, but 
Johnson ceased operations and filed chapter 11 prior to compliance. Id. 
168. Id. at 141. The Third Circuit cited Kovacs which held that Ohio's injunction 
directing the cleanup of hazardous waste was no more than an unsecured claim and 
noted that Mid/antic was not controlling because that decision expressly declined to 
reach the issue of what priority, if any, ought to be afforded a claim for the cost of 
cleanup. Id. 
169. Id. at 138. 
170. Id. at 142. 
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estate. In each case, the court properly refused to pnont1ze the 
prepetition general unsecured claim as an administrative expense without 
express authority from state or federal law. 
A. The Role ofMidlantic In Determining Administrative Priority 
In sorting out the proper treatment of environmental claims in light of 
the competing policies of environmental law and bankruptcy law, most 
courts look to Mid/antic for guidance. Abandonment is considered 
relevant based on the premise that if a trustee cannot abandon property 
without satisfying certain conditions, he can neither maintain nor possess 
that property without _satisfying the same conditions.171 The cost 
incurred in satisfying those conditions is entitled to priority as an 
administrative expense of the estate. 172 Courts recognize that the real 
issue in abandonment is not disposing of the property but determining 
who is liable for environmental cleanup.173 As a result, most courts 
presented with the issue of abandonment interpret Mid/antic narrowly, 
whereas most courts presented with the issue of reimbursement of 
environmental cleanup costs rely on a broad interpretation of Mid/antic. 
Interestingly, Mid/antic expressly declined to address the treatment of 
environmental claims in bankruptcy. 174 Nevertheless, varying interpre-
tations of Mid/antic :S, exception have resulted in conflicting case law 
regarding when environmental claims are entitled to treatment as 
administrative expenses. The conflict is based on the fact that courts do 
not agree on the conditions under which Mid/antic authorizes abandon-
ment. Courts. relying on a narrow interpretation of Midlantic have 
denied payment of environmental claims as administrative expenses 
absent imminent and identifiable harm. 175 Courts relying on a broad 
interpretation of Mid/antic have granted administrative priority to 
environmental claims resulting from noncompliance with laws intended 
to protect the public health and safety.176 Arguably, the narrow 
interpretation of Mid/antic is the proper interpretation based on the 
express language of the opinion.177 
171. In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). 
172. Id. 
173. In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 274 n.9 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In 
re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). 
174. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 
498 n.2 (1986). 
175. In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989). 
176. Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 270. 
177. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Narrow Interpretation o/Midlantic 
Courts interpreting Midlantic narrowly find an exception to the general 
rule that prepetition environmental claims should be treated as general 
unsecured claims when environmental liability causes imminent and 
identifiable harm to the public health and safety. For example, in the 
case of In re Pierce Coal & Construction, Inc., 178 the court recognized 
an implied exception179 to the classification of prepetition environmen-
tal claims as general unsecured claims based on its interpretation of the 
Midlantic decision. The exception is triggered w.hen "imminent and 
identifiable harm" is present. 180 Midlantic provides the rationale for 
the exception: where imminent and identifiable harm is present, the 
priorities of the Bankruptcy Code become subservient to environmental 
laws designed to protect the public safety. 181 Consequently, the Pierce 
Coal court reasoned that if the exception applies, then "the necessary 
costs of protecting the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm may be elevated to administrative [expense] priori-
ty."182 However, although the court recognized the exception, it found 
that it did not apply in this case.183 
Pierce Coal involved both prepetition and postpetition claims. In 
Pierce Coal, the bankruptcy court held that the cost of reclamation of 
land damaged prepetition could not be accorded administrative expense 
priority and should be treated as a general unsecured claim because 
Midlantic '.s' narrow exception did not apply.184 However, the court 
also held that the cost of reclamation of land damaged during 
178. 65 B.R. 521 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986). The debtor operated a surface 
mining business for a year under chapter 11 before conversion of the case to chapter 7. 
Id. at 522-23. The court considered the priority of the state's claim against the estate 
for the cost of reclaiming property mined by the debtor both prepetition and postpetition. 
Id. at 530-31. 
179. Id. at 531. The court recognized an implied exception to the general rule that 
prepetition environmental claims are general unsecured claims where imminent and 
identifiable harm is present, but the court refused to apply the exception because no such 
harm was present based on the evidence presented. 
180. Id. 
181. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 
506-07 (1986). 
182. Pierce Coal, 65 B.R. at 531. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 531. 
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postpetition operations would be entitled to administrative priority 
because the cost was necessary to preserve the estate. 185 The court 
explained that a bankruptcy court has no authority to elevate a 
prepetition unsecured claim to an administrative expense.186 The court 
noted that although "[c]ongressional intent to allow enforcement of 
environmental regulations is clear,"187 congressional intent to preclude 
governmental agencies from gaining favored priority as creditors while 
acting under the umbrella of their governmental enforcement powers is 
explicit. 188 
The exception was also recognized in the case of In re Stevens. 189 
In that case, the court decided that the costs incurred by a state agency 
in protecting the public from imminent and identifiable danger due to 
improper and illegal storage of hazardous waste were entitled to 
treatment as administrative expenses. 190 The court explained that 
under these circumstances, Midlantic altered the criteria for determining 
the allowance· of administrative expenses set forth in the Bankruptcy 
Code.191 The Stevens court noted Midlantic s rationale for the excep-
tion, namely that "public health and safety take precedence over the 
longstanding, but more parochial, concerns of efficient bankruptcy 
administration." 192 
The costs of taking precautions necessary to protect the public from 
imminent harm should be treated as administrative expenses, whether or 
not the trustee chooses to abandon the property and whether or not the 
claim is prepetition or postpetition. Although the Midlantic decision did 
not address the source of funding for precautionary measures, the costs 
are actual and necessary to effectuate abandonment of the property for 
the benefit of the estate and therefore qualify as an administrative 
expense pursuant to section 503 .193 Theoretically, the trustee will only 
abandon property and incur the l!dministrative expense if·the cost of 
taking precautions is less than the cost of keeping the property. 
However, if the trustee is precluded from abandoning property without 
185. Id. at 530. 
186. Id. at 531. 
187. Id. at 530 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)). This section of the Bankruptcy Code 
provides that an exception to the automatic stay exists to allow governmental agencies 
to exercise police powers, including enforcement of environmental regulations. Id. 
188. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5)). This section provides that enforcement of 
a money judgment is an exception to the police power exception; enforcement of a 
money judgment is an act which is subject to the automatic stay. Id. 
189. 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987). 
190. Id. at 783. 
191. Id. at 780-81. 
192. Id. at 781. 
193. In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572, 580 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991). 
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taking adequate precautions to protect the public from imminent harm, 
there is a strong argument that the trustee should be required to take 
those same precautions even if he chooses to keep the property. 
Mid/antic '.s' policy of protecting the public health and safety from 
imminent harm supports this proposition. Therefore, the precautions 
necessary to protect the public from imminent harm must be taken 
whether or not the trustee seeks to abandon, and the associated costs 
should be treated as administrative expenses. 
Several other courts, acting in concert with these principles, have 
denied administrative priority to environmental claims absent a showing 
of imminent and identifiable harm. For example, in the case of In re Jr. 
Food Mart of Arkansas, Inc., the bankruptcy court denied administrative 
expense priority for the costs of removing underground gas tanks 
because the cost was neither necessary to preserve nor beneficial to the 
bankruptcy estate. 194 There was no evidence that the tanks created an 
environmental hazard or posed a threat to the public health and safety 
or that cleanup was required. 195 
The Shore court also denied administrative priority to environmental 
claims absent a showing of imminent and identifiable harm. 196 The 
Shore court allowed the trustee to abandon the contaminated property 
and, finding no imminent harm, refused to authorize use of the 
unencumbered assets of the bankruptcy estate for cleanup purposes to 
satisfy· the prepetition environmental claim.197 The court found the 
depletion of estate assets a relevant though not an overriding concern to 
be considered by the court. 198 Finally. the court decided that adminis-
trative expenditures to clean up the property would only deplete the 
estate without yielding any contemporaneous benefit to, the estate. 199 
194. 144 B.R. 423 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992). The owners of property leased by the 
debtor to operate a gasoline station requested payment for the cost of removing 
underground storage tanks after the debtor vacated the premises. Id. at 424. 
195. Id. at 425. 
196. Shore, 134 B.R. at 578. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. 
197. Shore, 134 B.R. at 579-80. 
198. Id. at 580 n.4; see also In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 170 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1989); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 274 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986). 
Contra In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). 
199. Shore, 134 B.R. at 580. 
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2. The Broad Interpretation of Midlantic 
Courts interpreting the Mid/antic decision broadly find an exception 
to the trustee's power of abandonment when abandonment is in 
contravention of any law designed to protect the public health and 
safety.200 Most courts interpreting Mid/antic broadly are presented not 
with the issue of abandonment but with the issue of the priority of 
environmental claims. These courts begin their analysis by referring to 
the Supreme Court's Mid/antic decision--a case which addressed the 
question of abandonment, not administrative priority. They find that the 
condition for abandonment is full compliance with laws designed to 
protect the public health and safety. Thus, if a trustee cannot abandon 
property because of noncompliance with an environmental law, then the 
cost incurred in complying with the environmental law is entitled to 
priority as an administrative expense.201 Courts interpreting the 
Mid/antic decision broadly focus on the condition of the property, rather 
than on the act of abandonment, and emphasize the greater importance 
of environmental policies over bankruptcy policies. 
For example, in the case of In re Peerless Plating Co.,202 the EPA 
sought reimbursement of CERCLA response costs as administrative 
expenses. Construing Mid/antic, the Peerless court found three 
conditions under which a trustee may abandon a hazardous waste site in 
contravention of environmental law. The court determined that a trustee 
may not abandon a hazardous waste site unless: 
1. the environmental law in question is so onerous as to interfere with the 
bankruptcy adjudication itself; or 
2. the environmental law in question is not reasonably designed to protect the 
public health or safety from identified hazards [imminent and identifiable harm]; 
or , 
3. the violation caused by abandonment would merely be speculative or 
indeterminate. 203 
200. Franklin Signal, 65 B.R. at 270. This position is based on the premise that a 
violation of an environmental law which is intended to protect the public health and 
safety creates a threat of imminent harm to the public health and safety. 
201. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1009-10 
(2d Cir. 1991); Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 
118, 123-24 (6th Cir. 1987); Micro/ab, 105 B.R. at 168; Peerless, 70 B.R. at 948-49. 
202. 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). Peerless Plating Co., due to 
regulatory and labor difficulties, ceased operations of its metal plating shop and filed 
bankruptcy under chapter 7. Id. at 945. Two months later, the EPA was informed that 
gas had been · detected in the plant. The EPA determined an immediate cleanup was 
necessary. Id. After the debtor and trustee declined to clean up, the EPA proceeded 
to clean up the property. The EPA demanded reimbursement from the trustee. Id. 
203. Id. at 947. 
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After considering these conditions, the court concluded that the trustee 
could not abandon the site in violation of CERCLA.204 Furthermore, 
the court decided that the EPA's cleanup costs were entitled to priority 
as administrative expenses because the EPA's cleanup discharged the 
bankruptcy estate's liability for the cleanup.205 
Although the court granted administrative priority based on a violation 
of CERCLA, the facts of the case arguably fall within Mid/antics 
narrow exception. The EPA, after learning that gas had been detected 
in the Peerless plant, undertook an immediate cleanup to protect public 
health and safety.206 The actual and necessary costs of the EPA's 
precautionary measures to protect the public health and safety from 
imminent and identifiable harm should be entitled to treatment as an 
administrative expense. This falls within Mid/antics narrow exception. 
In the case of In re Stevens, 207 a state agency sought administrative 
expense priority for the reimbursement costs incurred in disposing of 
drums containing hazardous waste. The court determined that a trustee 
could not abandon the drums because abandonment posed a threat to 
public safety and was in contravention of state laws reasonably designed 
to protect the public.208 The Stevens court found that abandonment 
required full compliance with "relevant" state and local laws.209 Since 
the chapter 7 trustee could not abandon the hazardous waste without 
fully complying with relevant state and local laws, the estate was liable 
for the cleanup costs and the state agency was entitled to administrative 
204. Id. at 947-48. 
205. Id. at 948. 
206. Id. at 945. 
207. 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987). The debtors owned a scrap metal business. While 
operating the business, the debtors acquired drums of oil containing dangerous levels of 
PCBs (prepetition). Id. at 775. In 1981, the debtors were instructed by the EPA to 
properly store the drums and dispose of them by January 1, 1984. Id. at 775-76. The 
debtors stored the material in a locked trailer lined with plastic but their precautions 
were not in compliance with EPA requirements. Id. at 776. The debtors 
failed to dispose of the drums prior to filing a chapter 7 petition for liquidation on April 
26, 1984. The debtors subsequently ceased operation of their business. Id. The state 
agency directed the trustee or debtor to dispose of the drums. Id. Neither the debtor nor 
the trustee undertook the cleanup. The state sought reimbursement for removal costs as 
an administrative expense. Id. 
208. Id. at 780. The court noted that abandonment to a debtor violates state law 
and the express policy of controlling hazardous waste to assure no threat to public health 
and safety. Id. 
209. Id. at 782 n.7. 
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expense priority.210 In this case, however, the debtor had taken 
precautions prepetition to protect the public health and safety by storing 
the drums in a locked trailer.211 The trustee maintained the precautions 
postpetition.212 The property was not abandoned without the estate 
adhering to conditions designed to protect the public's health and safety. 
Therefore, the facts in this case do not appear to fall within Mid/antic '.s' 
narrow exception and Mid/antic does not support the court's hold-
ing.213 
In the case of In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 214 the state 
sought reimbursement for environmental cleanup costs associated with 
drums containing hazardous waste which belonged to the bankruptcy 
estate and which were stored on the debtor's leased manufacturing site. 
The court determined that the chapter 7 trustee could not have aban-
doned the property because the debtor violated state law intended to 
protect the public health and safety prepetition and the violations 
continued postpetition.215 The court found that because the trustee 
could not abandon the property, the expenses incurred to comply with 
state law were "actual and necessary, both to preserve the estate in 
required compliance with state law and to protect the health and safety 
of a potentially endangered public."216 Because the state discharged 
the estate's cleanup obligation, the state was entitled to reimbursement 
of cleanup costs as administrative expenses.217 
The rationale of the Wall Tube court is irreconcilable with the facts of 
the case. In order to qualify for administrative expense priority under 
Mid/antic, expenses must be incurred to protect the public from an 
imminent and identifiable harm.218 Although the court explained that 
abandonment would have subjected the public to the "same threat the 
210. Id. at 783. 
211. Id. at 776. 
212. Id. 
213. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Stevens 
court's recognition of an exception to the general rule that prepetition environmental 
claims should be treated as general unsecured claims even when environmental liability 
causes 
imminent and identifiable harm to the public health and safety. 
214. Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118 
(6th Cir. 1987). The debtor operated a metal product manufacturing business on leased 
property, generating hazardous waste which was stored in drums on the site. Id. at 119-
20. The state undertook the cleanup and sought reimbursement as an administrative 
expense. Id. at 121. 
215. Id. at 122. 
216. Id. at 124. 
217. Id. 
218. Midlantic Nat'! Bank v. New Jersey Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 
507 n.9 (1986). 
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court in Midlantic sought to avoid-a continuing, potentially disastrous 
environmental health hazard,"219 the facts of the case do not support 
the conclusion that there was an imminent and identifiable threat. In 
fact, the drums of hazardous waste were not actually disposed of for 
over two years after being discovered. 220 
In the case of Chateaugay, the district court held that all environmen-
tal cleanup costs assessed postpetition with respect to sites currently 
owned by debtor where there had been a prepetition release or threatened 
release of hazardous wastes were entitled to administrative priority.221 
The issue on appeal was whether this was an attempt to convert 
prepetition contingent claims to priority status by simply liquidating 
them. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the 
district court and held that "[i]f property on which toxic substances pose 
a significant hazard to public health cannot be abandoned, it must the 
[sic] follow . . . that expenses to remove the threat posed by such 
substances are necessary to preserve the estate."222 The court appeared 
to rely on a broad interpretation of Mid/antic to support granting 
administrative priority to the prepetition environmental claims. In fact, 
the determinative factors in the court's decision were the debtor's 
continued operations postpetition under chapter 11 and the CERCLA 
liability incurred by the estate postpetition, . not the presence of an 
imminent and identifiable threat to the public.223 The Chateaugay 
court explained that the "EPA is doing more than fixing the amount of 
its [contingent] claim; it is acting, during administration of the [ chapter 
219. Wall Tube, 831 F.2d at 122. 
220. Id. at 120 & n.5. 
221. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1009-10 
(2d Cir. 1991). LTV, a diversified steel, aerospace, and energy corporation, filed chapter 
11 and scheduled 24 pages of contingent environmental claims held by the EPA. Id. at 
999. The EPA asserted $32 million in prepetition response costs at 14 identified sites. 
There were potentially more sites at which LTV might have been a PRP and the $32 
million may have been only a small fraction of the total response costs required to clean 
up all of the sites. Id. · 
222. Id. at 1010. 
223. · Id. at 999. The court explained that the debtor's obligation to assure that 
facilities it operates postpetition comply with environmental laws is not dischargeable 
and that CERCLA response costs incurred during the bankruptcy at sites owned or 
operated by the debtor are entitled to administrative expense priority. Id. . 
Courts have granted administrative expense status to 
environmental claims based on liability incurred not by the debtor prepetition, but by the 
bankruptcy estate postpetition as an owner of contaminated property. 
265 
11] estate, to remedy the ongoing effects of a release of hazardous 
substances. "224 
In the case of In re Micro/ab, Inc.,225 the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts sought to compel a chapter 7 trustee to clean up the debtor's 
industrial site. The court relied on Mid/antic, even though the trustee 
did not seek to abandon the site, reasoning that "if the Trustee cannot 
abandon property without satisfying certain conditions, neither can he 
maintain or possess it without satisfying them."226 The court deter-
mined that abandonment requires full compliance with state environmen-
tal laws subJect to four conditions.227 Three of the conditions rarely 
are in issue. 28 However, the fourth condition, lack of estate assets to 
comply with environmental law, is common. According to condition 
four, if the trustee does not have sufficient funds to comply with 
environmental law, then the trustee does not have to comply with state 
law in order to abandon property. In Micro/ab, the fourth condition was 
in issue.229 Even after the court found "imminent and identifiable 
harm" to the public, the court refused to order the trustee to clean up the 
property because no significant improvement in , the condition of the 
property would result from exhaustion of the estate's funds.230 
Although Mid/antic requires a chapter 7 trustee to bring contaminated 
224. Id. at 1010. 
225. 105 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). The debtor's bankruptcy estate 
contained real property which had been contaminated with hazardous substances before 
the debtor filed a petition under chapter 7. Id. at 161-62. The trustee did not seek to 
abandon the site. Id. at 163. Instead, a state agency wanted the trustee to remediate the 
contamination at the estate's expense or to pay the state agency's cleanup costs as an 
administrative expense. Id. at 162. The estate contained approximately $750,000 of 
unencumbered cash. The state's estimate to clean up the site was two million dollars. 
Id. at 164. , 
226. Id. at 168. 
227. The four conditions are: 
1. The laws must be reasonably calculated to protect the public health or 
safety from imminent and identifiable harm. 
2. The violation resulting from abandonment may not be speculative or 
indeterminate. 
3. The law must not be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy 
adjudication itself. 
4. The trustee cannot be ordered to clean up when he does not have financial 
resources to do so. 
Id. at 169. 
228. First, environmental laws are typically intended to protect public health and 
safety. Second, rarely are violations of an environmental law speculative or indetermi-
nate. Third, the Supreme Court provided no standard for determining whether a law is 
so "onerous" as to interfere with bankruptcy adjudication, so this is difficult to prove. 
The EPA often has already taken action based on a thorough investigation. 
229. Id. at 169. 
230. Id. 
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property into compliance with state environmental laws on an adminis-
trative expense basis, that requirement is subject to the limitation of 
estate assets necessary to achieve appreciable results. 
The Peerless, Stevens, Wall Tube, Chateaugay, and Micro/ab courts, 
each presented with the issue of liability for environmental cleanup 
costs, interpreted Mid/antic broadly, requiring full compliance with state 
and federal laws intended to protect the public health and safety.231 
These courts found that the costs incurred in complying with state law 
were entitled to treatment as administrative expenses. However, the 
Mid/antic opinion expressly stated that the exception to the trustee's 
power of abandonment was a narrow one requiring the existence of an 
imminent and identifiable harm to the public health and safety.232 
These courts failed to recognize the express language of the Mid/antic 
decision. Their decisions are inconsistent with the decisions of other 
courts233 that have applied Mid/antic to abandonment cases and with 
the Supreme Court's Kovacs decision, which acknowledged that a trustee 
may abandon property in violation of environmental law but that a party 
who subsequently receives and possesses the property must comply with 
environmental laws.234 
Although Mid/antic may stand for the proposition that costs incurred 
in taking precautionary measures to protect the public from imminent 
harm are entitled to treatment as administrative expenses, nothing in the 
Bankruptcy Code nor in state law provides that any environmental claim 
arising from a violation of environmental law is to be accorded 
administrative expense priority.235 The narrow exception carved out 
in Mid/antic does not authorize administrative expense priority for costs 
incurred in complying with environmental laws absent a showing of 
imminent harm to the public, and then only to the extent necessary to 
protect the public. Violations of state or federal environmental laws are 
not to be treated lightly, but a violation is not conclusive evidence of the 
existence of an imminent and identifiable harm. The particular 
231. Although subject to exceptions in several cases. 
232. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 
507 n.9 (1986). 
233. In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, 119 B.R. 45 (D.N.J. 1990); In re Shore Co., 
134 B.R. 572 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. 1986); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986). 
234. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985). 
235. In re Shore Co., 134 B.R. 572, 580 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991). 
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circumstances surrounding a violation must be examined to determine 
whether such harm is present. The Mid/antic exception does not justify 
prioritizing reimbursement of CERCLA response costs absent a showing 
of imminent and identifiable harm to the public health and safety. 
The Peerless, Stevens, Wall Tube, and Chateaugay courts granted 
administrative priority for costs incurred in complying with environmen-
tal law. However, Mid/antic did not even address administrative 
priority and, to the extent administrative priority was implied, it was 
limited to the narrow exception carved out in the opinion. Nothing in 
the Bankruptcy Code creates administrative expense priority for claims 
to cure violations of any law designed to protect the public health and 
safety. Under nonbankruptcy law, environmental liability is "prioritized" 
ahead of unsecured creditors only by creating and perfecting a security 
interest in real or personal property.236 Absent such an interest, 
nothing in nonbankruptcy law establishes a priority that can be applied 
in bankruptcy. 
Although environmental policies are important, courts should not 
ignore the priorities established by Congress under the Bankruptcy Code 
and the priorities established by state legislatures under state law. As 
Justice O'Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion in Kovacs, state 
and federal legislatures have the freedom to establish their own priorities 
for environmental claims.237 Alternatively, Congress is free to change 
the priorities established in the Bankruptcy Code to specially prioritize 
environmental claims. The courts should not compromise existing law 
by relying on a broad interpretation of Mid/antic to prioritize environ-
mental claims. 
If one claimant is to be preferred over others, the purpose should be 
clear from the statute.238 Giving priority to a claimant not clearly 
entitled · to priority is inconsistent with the policy of equality of 
distribution and dilutes the value· of the priority for those creditors 
Congress intended to prefer. 
B. The Role of Environmental Law in Determining Administrative 
· Priority · 
The treatment of environmental claims in bankruptcy is particularly 
complex because the proper treatment depends on the type of bankruptcy 
236. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
237. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
238. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952); Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. 
(In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950, 953 (1st Cir. 1976) (quoting Nathanson v. 
NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952)). 
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(reorganization or liquidation), the type of claim (prepetition or 
postpetition), and the law from which the claim is derived ( e.g., 
CERCLA, RCRA, etc.). In determining administrative priority issues, 
a distinction must be drawn between prepetition claims asserted against 
the debtor and postpetition claims asserted against the bankruptcy estate. 
The general rule is that prepetition environmental claims should be 
treated as general unsecured claims. Mid/antic established a narrow 
exception to the general rule when prepetition environmental liability 
causes imminent and identifiable harm to· the public health and safety. 
The costs incurred by the bankruptcy trustee in protecting the public 
from such imminent and identifiable harm are entitled to priority as 
administrative expenses.239 In addition, postpetition environmental 
claims incurred during the bankruptcy may be entitled to priority as 
administrative expenses. 240 
When a debtor files bankruptcy, the assets of the debtor become 
property of the bankruptcy "estate." If environmentally impacted 
property owned by the debtor becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, the 
question arises: To what extent does the estate incur liability as an owner 
or operator of the property? If a trustee is allowed to abandon the 
property, the abandonment is retroactive to the petition date; the result 
is that the estate incurs no liability as an owner because the effect of 
abandonment is the same as if the estate never owned the property.241 
However, the estate does remain liable for prepetition environmental 
claims incurred by the debtor.242 
Some environmental statutes, like CERCLA, impose liability on the 
current owner or operator of the property, regardless of fault. Since the 
trustee cannot abandon environmentally burdened property because there 
exists an imminent and identifiable harm to public health or safety, the 
costs incurred in taking precautions to protect the public from that harm 
are treated as an administrative expense.243 If the trustee takes the 
necessary precautions and then abandons, the estate should be able to 
avoid liability as an owner or operator. 
239. See supra notes 178-92 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
242. Although the estate remains liable, the debtor may be discharged from 
prepetition debts. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
243. See, e.g., In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989). 
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If the trustee chooses to keep the property or to continue to operate its 
business on the property, the question arises whether the estate incurs 
postpetition liability under CERCLA as an "owner or operator." In the 
case of In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 244 the court considered this 
issue. The EPA asserted a postpetition CERCLA claim against the 
bankruptcy estate based on postpetition operations, not on the debtor's 
prepetition operations.245 
The court, apparently unclear about the effective date of abandonment, 
offered two alternative outcomes. First, assuming the trustee was 
permitted to abandon the drums, the court found that the estate would 
nevertheless incur CERCLA liability as an operator of the site.246 This 
position was based on the premise that abandonment was not retroactive 
to the petition date. According to this premise, abandonment would not 
free the estate from liability incurred as an operator from the petition 
date to the date of abandonment. However, most courts hold that the 
effective date of abandonment is retroactive to the petition date.247 
As an alternative holding, the court decided that if abandonment is 
retroactive to the petition date, thus relieving the estate of liability under 
CERCLA, then the trustee would not be permitted to abandon the 
property based on public policy considerations requiring compliance with 
state and local laws regulating the abandonment of hazardous waste.248 
Thus, under this alternative, the court required (as a condition of 
abandonment) that the trustee comply with CERCLA. In order to 
abandon, the estate would have to satisfy the existing CERCLA liability 
as an administrative expense.249 In either case, the court refused to 
allow the estate to avoid CERCLA liability.250 The court found that 
the costs incurred in satisfying the estate's CERCLA liability were 
244. 45 B.R. 278 (Banlcr. N.D. Ohio 1985). This decision was prior to the 
Mid/antic decision. The corporation operated a rubber recycling plant on property 
leased from the corporation's owner. Id. at 280. The debtor in possession operated 
under chapter 11 for eight months before the case was converted to chapter 7. Id. The 
EPA discovered drums containing hazardous materials which had been buried on leased 
property prepetition. Id. at 281. The EPA undertook a cleanup effort and sought 
reimbursement of its CERCLA claim against the estate as an administrative expense 
based on the estate's postpetition ownership and operation of the property. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 284. 
247. E.g., In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Banlcr. W.D. Mich. 1987). "Of 
course, title to property abandoned by the estate revests, usually in the debtor, 
retroactively to the date of commencement of the case. Therefore, if the estate could 
abandon under Mid/antic, . .. the estate could avoid [CERCLA] liability [for owning the 
site]." Id. at 948 (citation omitted). See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
248. T.P. Long Chem., 45 B.R. at 284. 
249. Id. at 286. 
250. Id. 
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actual, necessary costs of preserving the estate and were entitled to 
administrative priority. 251 
Keeping in mind that under CERCLA a bankruptcy estate is liable for 
owning or operating a hazardous waste site, one can conclude from the 
foregoing discussion that if the trustee or debtor in possession can 
abandon the property, the estate can avoid. postpetition CERCLA 
liability. However, if the trustee or debtor in possession cannot abandon 
the property, the estate, as the owner or operator of the property, is 
subject to postpetition CERCLA liability. This is true notwithstanding 
the fact that the EPA may have a valid prepetition claim against the 
estate based on the debtor's prepetition ownership or operation. 
Although a bankruptcy estate may incur postpetition CERCLA liability 
based on ownership or operation of estate property, CERCLA does not 
establish what priority such a claim should receive in bankruptcy. A 
bankruptcy court faithfully applying the Bankruptcy Code will treat a 
prepetition CERCLA claim as a "general unsecured claim."252 Similar-
ly, the court will treat a postpetition CERCLA claim as a "general 
unsecured claim" unless the court finds that the postpetition claim is 
entitled to administrative priority because the requirements of section 
503 are satisfied.253 
As we have seen, inside of bankruptcy, some courts "prioritize" 
environmental claims ahead of other unsecured creditors, even though 
such prioritization would not be available outside of bankruptcy and 
notwithstanding the fact that the requirements for such prioritization are 
not met. An unsecured environmental claim should not be entitled to 
priority ahead of other unsecured creditors merely because it arises out 
of the violation of an environmental law. The court should prioritize an 
environmental claim only if the statutory requirements set forth in 
section 503(b )(1 )(A) are met.254 One court has explained that prioritiz-
ation of claims under section 503(b) "begins with the premise that all the 
251. Id. 
252. See supra part II.B. 
253. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) (1988). The section provides: "After notice and a 
hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses . . . including . . . the actual, 
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or 
commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case .... " Id. See 
supra part II.B. 
254. Although CERCLA provides for the creation of a federal lien on property to 
secure the payment of response costs, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (1988), a lien on property of 
the estate perfected postpetition may be avoided, 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1988). 
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costs to be considered are postpetition and some of them will receive 
administrative-expense priority."255 Nevertheless, bankrupcty courts 
continue to grant administrative priority to the EPA for unsecured 
environmental claims. 
Some courts have taken one step further and granted environmental 
claims priority ahead of secured creditors. One example is the case of 
In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc. 256 The bankruptcy court, interpreting 
Mid/antic narrowly, held that because the trustee had no unencumbered 
assets to :finance a cleanup and there was no imminent danger to the 
public, the trustee could abandon the property even though violations of 
environmental laws existed.257 However, the court also granted the 
EPA a superpriority lien on the property to secure repayment of the 
EPA's cleanup costs.258 Ironically, CERCLA provided a statutory 
basis for establishing only a junior lien on the property.259 Thus, 
outside of bankruptcy the EPA would not be able to attain this 
superpriority lien. Nevertheless, the court found that the EPA was 
entitled, as the trustee would be under section 506(c),260 to recover 
cleanup costs, ahead of any secured creditors, because the cleanup 
provided a benefit to the secured creditor.261 Without reimbursement 
of the EPA's costs, the secured creditor would have received an unfair 
windfall at the taxpayers' expense.262 
The case of In re Mowbray Engineering Co. 263 presented the. 
bankruptcy court with a similar situation. In that case the trustee could 
not abandon the property without cleaning it up, but the estate had no 
assets available for cleanup.264 The court allowed abandonment but 
255. Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.), 
963 F.2d 1449, 1460 (11th Cir. 1992). . 
256. 105 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989). The chapter 7 trustee moved to 
abandon the debtor's real property and leases. The EPA did not oppose abandonment 
provided it received priority liens on the properties ahead of the secured lenders. Id. at 
915. The EPA would then be first in line to collect the proceeds of the sale of the 
property subsequent to decontamination. 
257. Id. at 917. 
258. Id. at 919. 
259. "42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) imposes liability on the owner or operator of any facility 
for 'all costs of removal or remedial 
action incurred by the United States Government.' Section 9607(/) creates a federal lien 
for such costs, but the lien is subject to prior valid liens." Id. at 917. 
260. Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: "The trustee may recover 
from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and 
expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the 
holder of such claim." II U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988). 
261. Better-Brite, 105 B.R. at 917-18. 
262. Id. at 918. 
263. 67 B.R. 34 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986). 
264. Id. at 35. 
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prioritized the EPA's claim for cleanup costs ahead of the secured 
creditors.265 The court explained that the "EPA stands in the shoes of 
the trustee in preserving the estate and is entitled, as the trustee would 
be but for abandonment, to recover costs upon sale of the property prior 
to satisfying any secured claims against the property."266 It is impor-
tant to note that outside of bankruptcy the EPA would not have been 
able to attain this priority ahead of secured creditors. 
C. The Role of "Reorganization " in Determining Administrative 
Priority 
One purpose of administrative priority is to facilitate rehabilitation of 
a debtor-business by encouraging third parties to provide goods and 
services. Congress has recognized that if a business is to be reorganized, 
third parties must be willing to provide the goods and services necessary 
to continue the operation.267 Because third parties will be unwilling 
to do so without assurance of payment, section 503 provides a priority 
for expenses incurred by the trustee or debtor in possession in order to 
continue business operations. Costs "ordinarily incident" to the 
postpetition operation of a reorganizing business are entitled to 
administrative priority because continued operation benefits the creditors 
of the estate.268 
It should be noted that Congress did intend that administrative 
expenses include claims other than those that preserve the assets of the 
bankruptcy estate.269 The language of section 503 indicates that 
administrative expenses include those that preserve the assets of the 
bankruptcy estate but are not restricted to only those that preserve the 
assets of the bankruptcy estate. For example, expenditures that deplete 
the estate's assets but rehabilitate the debtor's business are entitled to 
administrative priority. 
265. Id. at 35-36. 
266. Id. at 35. 
267. Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950, 
954 (1st Cir. 1976). 
268. Creditors are entitled to be treated under a chapt(;)r 11 plan at least as well as 
they would be treated under a chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988). 
269. Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.), 
963 F.2d 1449, 1456 (11th Cir. 1992). 
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Controversy has arisen regarding whether the bankruptcy estate must 
actually benefit from an administrative expenditure. The question is how 
broadly should the term "administrative expenses" be interpreted. Many 
courts grant administrative priority only if the costs either help 
rehabilitate the business or preserve the estates assets, thus providing a 
benefit in some way to the estate.270 These courts rely on the overrid-
ing concern in bankruptcy of "keeping fees and administrative expenses 
at a minimum so as to preserve as much of the estate as possible for the 
creditors. "271 · 
The Supreme Court has not construed the term "administrative 
expens~s" narrowly.272 Consequently, neither have many lower courts. 
For example, one court found that "costs that form 'an integral and 
essential element of the continuation of the business' are necessary 
expenses even though priority is not necessary to the continuation of the 
business. "273 In Reading Co. v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that 
those injured by the negligence of a bankruptcy trustee operating the 
debtor's business during reorganization were entitled to recover damages 
as administrative expenses.274 The Court reasoned that "[e]xisting 
creditors are, to be sure, in a dilemma not of their own making, but there 
is no obvious reason why they should be allowed to attempt to escape 
that dilemma at the risk of imposing it on others equally innocent."275 
The Court was concerned with fairness and policies of compensating 
innocent tort victims for injury suffered and encouraging trustees to 
adequately insure the businesses they operate.276 These policies form 
the basis for the longstanding general rule of imposing a receiver's tort 
liability on the receivership. 
270. E.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 
853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc. 65 B.R. 521 (Bankr. 
N.D. W. Va. 1986) (holding that the cost of reclamation of land damaged during 
postpetition operations was entitled to administrative priority because the cost was 
necessary to preserve the estate and that the estate benefited by postpetition mining 
operations); In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 23 B.R. 104, 121 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(cited in N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1454); In re Vennont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 25 B.R. 
804, 806 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (finding 
that the expenses incurred in removing a dangerous building which had collapsed 
postpetition on the debtor's leased premises were entitled to treatment as an administra-
tive expense because removal was necessary for preservation of the leasehold as part of 
the chapter 11 bankruptcy estate and was necessary for the public's safety). 
271. N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1454 (quoting Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43, 53 
(1947)). . 
272. Id. 
273. Id. (quoting Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 484 (1968)). 
274. 391 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1968). 
275. Id. at 482-83. 
276. N.P. Mining, 963 F.2d at 1456. 
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Based on the principles of "fairness" expressed in Reading, some 
courts have granted administrative priority to the actual, necessary costs 
of preserving the estate even though there was no actual benefit to the 
estate. Courts focusing on fairness to innocent persons injured by the 
estate's actions may be inclined to expand the meaning of administrative 
expense to claims that do not aid the rehabilitation of the business or 
preserve a maximum of assets for distribution. But if the "fairness to 
innocent victims" argument is determinative in deciding administrative 
expense status, any postpetition act which violates the law and damages 
another should be treated as an administrative expense entitled to priority 
ahead of prepetition creditors. Such a broad interpretation of administra-
tive priority would discourage creditors from supporting a chapter 11 
reorganization and force distressed businesses into liquidation.277 
Creditors of a chapter 11 bankruptcy estate would be unwilling to 
become insurers arainst liability which would not be insurable by 
traditional means.27 
D. The Role of 28 US.C. § 959 in Determining Administrative 
Priority 
When the trustee continues to own or operate the property, does the 
trustee or debtor in possession have a duty to operate the property in 
compliance with state laws? Are costs of compliance entitled to 
administrative expense priority? Must prepetition claims be satisfied 
and violations be corrected postpetition as administrative expenses? 
Should the trustee's liability for noncompliance postpetition be entitled 
to administrative expense priority when the same liability for noncompli-
ance incurred by the debtor prepetition is only treated as a general 
unsecured claim? 
These questions cannot be answered without first considering the 
duties of the bankruptcy trustee. It is well recognized that an owner or 
operator of property outside of bankruptcy must abide by state law. 
Similarly, Congress has mandated that a trustee managing and operating 
estate property must abide by state law.279 Thus, section 959(b) 
277. Reading, 391 U.S. at 487 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
278. Id. at 489. 
279. Section 959 provides: 
[A] trustee ... appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United 
States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property 
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requires that liability incurred postpetition by a trustee or debtor in 
possession be paid from the assets of the estate. However, controversy 
arises regarding the priority of such liability incurred by the trustee on 
behalf of the estate. The resolution of this controversy depends on 
whether the bankruptcy is a reorganization or liquidation. 
1. Reorganization 
When a trustee or debtor in possession operates the debtor's business 
postpetition, section 959 applies.28° Compliance with state law is 
required and the associated costs should be treated as administrative 
expenses necessary to preserve the estate. When a business is in 
reorganization, it is attempting to start anew as a viable, going concern. 
During the reorganization the business must abide by the same laws and 
regulations as its competitors. Otherwise, the bankruptcy estate would 
have an unfair advantage over nonbankrupt competitors. Businesses 
under the protection of chapter 11 should not be allowed to cut costs and 
to benefit by ignoring safety, environmental, or any other laws.281 To 
assure that the estate will receive no advantage over other competitors, 
penalties and fines imposed on the bankruptcy estate resulting from 
violations of nonbankruptcy law by the trustee should be given 
administrative priority. The estate creditors would obtain the benefits 
associated with the debtor's business operating as a going concern but 
would incur the liability associated with trustee's violation of state or 
federal nonbankruptcy law. 
The Supreme Court addressed. this issue in Reading. In that case, the 
Court decided that tort liability incurred by the receiver during 
postpetition operation of the debtor's business was a cost of doing 
business entitled to administrative priority.282 The Court justified its 
holding based in part upon the fact 'that the injury was one which might 
have been insured against. The Court sought to encourage receivers to 
insure adequately the businesses they operate. Insuring against tort 
liability is a common practice and the costs would clearly qualify for 
administrative priority because they are necessary to preserve the assets 
in his possession as such trustee, according to the requirements of the valid 
laws of the State in · 
which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or 
possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof. 
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988). 
280. Id. 
281. Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.), 
963 F.2d 1449, 1456 (11th Cir. 1992). 
282. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968). See supra notes 274-78 and 
accompanying text. 
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of the estate. In the Reading case, however, the damage was so great 
that insurance coverage likely would have been inadequate to compen-
sate for the loss.283 Nevertheless, the risk and resulting liability was 
a consequence of the trustee's continued operation of the debtor's 
business. The estate obtained the benefit of the ongoing business subject 
to the risks and liability associated with continued operations that any 
other similar business might incur. 
In the case of In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc. the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit extended the Reading decision by granting 
administrative priority to a compensatory civil fine imposed against the 
debtor in possession for a postpetition violation of an injunction to abate 
a nuisance.284 The court found that a postpetition "intentional act 
which violates the law and damages others" should be treated as an 
administrative expense.285 
Another example of the treatment of this issue is presented in the case 
of In re Laurinburg Oil Co. 286 In that case, the debtor maintained and 
operated a waste disposal facility postpetition. The state sought 
injunctive relief to abate postpetition violations of water pollution laws 
which were creating a threatened release of hazardous waste. The 
bankruptcy court, relying only on section 959, found that the reasonable 
and necessary expenses incurred to abate violations of the state water 
pollution laws were administrative expenses necessary to preserve the 
estate.287 
Based on section 959 and these decisions, it is reasonable to conclude 
that penalties for violations of state and federal law are entitled to 
administrative expense priority as necessary costs of the continuing 
operation of the chapter 11 debtor's business. Arguably such penalties 
are not entitled to administrative priority because they provide no benefit 
to the bankruptcy estate, even though they are properly considered part 
of the cost of the debtor's continued business operations. But neither 
logic nor legal precedent support this position. First, the estate will 
benefit if allowed to operate postpetition without making the expendi-
tures necessary to comply with state environmental laws. Second, the 
283. Reading, 391 U.S. at 483. 
284. Spunt v. Charlesbank Laundry, Inc. (In re Charlesbank Laundry, Inc.), 755 
F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1985). 
285. Id. at 203. 
286. 49 B.R. 652 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984). 
287. Id. at 654. . 
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Supreme Court has found postpetition penalties incurred by a trustee 
while operating the debtor's business postpetition were entitled to 
administrative priority under the Bankruptcy Act.288 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, convinced that 
the bankruptcy estate was liable for all penalties arising out of the 
trustee's postpetition operation of the debtor's business, regardless of 
their type, granted the postpetition penalties priority as administrative 
expenses.289 The court reasoned that although prepetition penalties 
should not reduce the distribution to the creditors because the creditors 
could not have prevented accrual of penalties, postpetition penalties 
could be granted priority as administrative expenses because during 
bankruptcy business operations are subject to court supervision and the 
creditors, having a voice in its operation, can prevent violations of the 
law and the accrual of penalties.290 Creditors benefiting from the 
postpetition operation of the debtor's business cannot object to the 
liabilities which arise under nonbankruptcy law as a result of the 
ongoing business. 
In another case, In re N.P. Mining Co., the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit granted administrative priority status to a punitive civil 
penalty for environmental violations resulting from the operation of the 
debtor's business postpetition.291 The priority status served the federal 
policy of requiring trustees to operate bankruptcy estates in compliance 
with state law.292 The court granted priority even though the penalties 
were not used to repair environmental damage,293 there was no evi-
dence of an imminent health hazard,294 and the estate was no longer 
in a position to abate violations and avoid :fines.295 The court, citing 
288. Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966); Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57 
(1939); see also In re Samuel Chapman, Inc., 394 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that 
creditors should not benefit from the debtor in possession's postpetition tax delinquencies 
and holding that the estate remains liable). In Boteler, the Supreme Court explained: 
"Subdivision 57(j) prohibits allowance of a tax penalty against the bankrupt estate only 
if incurred by the bankrupt before bankruptcy by reason of his own delinquency. After 
bankruptcy, it does not purport to exempt the trustee from the operation of state laws, 
or to relieve the estate from liability for the trustee's delinquencies." Boteler, 308 U.S. 
at 59-60. 
289. United States Dep't oflnterior v. Elliott (In re Elkins Energy Corp.), 761 F.2d 
168, 171 (4th Cir. 1985) (granting administrative-expense status to postpetition penalties 
assessed against the debtor mining company for postpetition misconduct). 
290. Id. 
291. Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.), 
963 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1992). 
292. Id. at 1458. 
293. Id. at 1452. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. at 1450. 
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Elliott, explained that creditors, who receive the benefit of the ongoing 
business and have influence over the debtor's business operations 
postpetition, must prevent violations of the law or bear financial 
responsibility for the consequences.296 To the court, the "punitive civil 
penalties assessed as a consequence of the operation of a bankruptcy 
estate's business [were] 'actual, necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving the estate' under section 503(b)(l)(A)."297 
So far, these decisions have involved penalties incurred as a result of 
postpetition operation of the debtor's business, and the courts have held 
that such penalties are entitled to administrative priority. However, a 
different issue regarding the proper classification and treatment of 
environmental penalties arose in the case of In re Bill :S Coal Co. 298 
In that case, the debtor attempted reorganization under chapter 11 but 
ceased all mining operations on the date of filing bankrufitcy.299 A 
year later the case was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation. 00 During 
the chapter 11 case, the state brought forty-two enforcement actions 
against the debtor for noncompensatory penalties resulting from 
violations of surface mining laws. 301 The court had to classify these 
claims as prepetition or postpetition. The court found the claims were 
postpetition30 even though all mining operations had ceased 
prepetition. Having found the claims were postpetition, the court had no 
difficulty granting them priority as administrative expenses, despite the 
lack of benefit to the estate, because the payment of a fine for the 
violation of environmental regulations should be considered a cost 
ordinarily incident to the operation of _the business.303 The court saw 
296. Id. at 1460. 
297. Id. at 1459. 
298. 124 B.R. 827 (D. Kan. 1991). 
299. Id. at 828. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 828-29. 
302. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision reasoning that the 
fact that the "debtor ceased strip mining when it filed for bankruptcy does not force the 
conclusion that the violations were pre-petition, since obligations to reclaim land or 
maintain certain land practices could continue regardless of whether [the] debtor was 
actively strip mining." Id. at 829. The bankruptcy court had previously (and seemingly 
correctly) found that the violations were prepetition claims based on the fact that the 
debtor ceased all mining operations prepetition. Id. at 828. 
303. Id. at 830 (relying on Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. 
Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 123-34 (6th Cir. 1987); Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit 
(In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988); Burlington N. R.R. v. 
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no reason to distinguish between compensatory and noncompensatory 
penalties304 and held that the penalties for the debtor's postpetition 
misconduct were to be treated as an administrative expense305 despite 
the lack of benefit to the estate.306 
The Bill :S- Coal decision is difficult to reconcile with other cases for 
several reasons. First, the penalties were a result of the debtor's 
prepetition conduct. Although the debtor was reorganizing in an attempt 
to continue as a viable business enterprise, the mining operations had 
ceased. The debt was not related to the ongoing business of the debtor. 
Second, the creditors had no control over the estate's liability for the 
penalties assessed postpetition. Because the claims were a result of the 
debtor's prepetition mining, neither the creditors nor the court had any 
control over the debtor to prevent the estate from incurring the liability. 
Third, the debt was not a consequence of the debtor's postpetition 
operations. The estate did not benefit from any postpetition mining 
operations and therefore the penalties should not have been treated as an 
administrative expense. 
2. Liquidation 
Although it is well recognized that section 959 applies to trustees in 
a bankruptcy reorganization, some controversy has arisen regarding the 
applicability of section 959 in a bankruptcy liquidation. A broad 
interpretation of section 959 leads to the conclusion that section 959 
applies both to liquidating and to reorganizing trustees. Several courts 
have taken this view. For example, the Stevens court reasoned that 
"[ s ]ince the [liquidating] trustee cannot abandon hazardous waste and 28 
U.S.C. § 959(b) requires that the trustee comply with valid state laws 
affecting such property, ... the cleanup . . . remains the responsibility 
of the estate."307 The Wall Tube'court also found that section 959(b) 
requires a chapter 7 trustee to comply with state environmental law.308 
That court found no consequential difference between the duties of a 
liquidating or reorganizing trustee with respect to compliance with 
section 959 because "[i]n either case, an environmental hazard ... is 
Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
304. Id. at 830. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 781 (D. Me. 1987). 
308. Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 
122 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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within the control of the trustee."309 Although the Supreme Court has 
not answered the question directly, the Court stated in Kovacs: 
[A]nyone in possession of the site - whether it is [the debtor] ... or the 
bankruptcy trustee - mm,t comply with the environmental laws of the State of 
Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the 
waters of the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions. 310 
On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of section 959 leads to the 
conclusion that section 959 only applies to reorganizing debtors. Several 
courts have also taken this view. For example, the NP. Mining court 
found that section 959 only applies when the property is managed or 
operated for the purpose of continuing operations.311 Similarly, the 
Microfab court found that section 959 "does not require a Chapter 7 
trustee to clean contaminated real estate" when the trustee neither 
managed nor operated the property.312 The Stevens court found that 
the fairer literal reading of section 959 was that it did not apply to a 
liquidating trustee.313 The narrow interpretation is preferable because 
it takes into consideration that a liquidating trustee does not have the 
same interests as an owner, operator, or even a reorganizing trustee. The 
liquidating trustee will not pursue the long-term benefits and address the 
long-term concerns that are the focus of attention for an owner, operator, 
or reorganizing trustee. Assuming the narrow interpretation, section 959 
cannot be used to create a postpetition claim against a bankruptcy estate 
arising out of prepetition conduct or environmental violations. Because 
there is no postpetition claim under these circumstances, the claim 
cannot be prioritized and the question. of priority is not an issue. 
However, even if one were to adopt the broad interpretation, and 
decide that section 959 is applicable to liquidating trustees, there is 
nothing in the section or elsewhere that establishes the priority of a 
claim against the estate based on section 959. As the Reading court 
noted, section 959 establishes only the principle of liability under state 
law and does not define from whom or with what priority the claim 
309. Id. 
310. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985). 
311. Alabama Surface Mining Comm'n v. N.P. Mining Co. (In re N.P. Mining Co.), 
963 F.2d 1449, 1460 (11th Cir. 1992). 
312. In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). 
313. In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 781 (D. Me. 1987).-
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ought to be collected.314 In order for such a claim to qualify for 
administrative priority, the claim must satisfy the requirements of section 
503 of the Bankruptcy Code. In a chapter 7 liquidation, a section 959 
claim will not satisfy the requirements of section 503 because such a 
claim is not a necessary expense to preserve the assets of the estate for 
the benefit of the creditors. 
The case of In re Bio-Med Laboratories provides an example 
illustrating the problems with the broad interpretation of section 959. In 
that case, the lessor sought reimbursement for the fair rental value of 
property occupied by the chapter 7 trustee for five months postpetition 
while the debtor undertook environmental cleanup.315 The bankruptcy 
court determined that the trustee could not abandon the property in 
contravention of state environmental protection law316 and, as a result, 
the debtor was a holdover tenant obligated to pay rent.317 In deciding 
to grant administrative priority for the lessor's claim, the court, 
apparently agreeing with the Wall Tube court, found it irrelevant whether 
the trustee was liquidating, managing, or reorganizing.318 The court 
found the lessor was entitled to rent as an administrative expense 
because allowing the debtor to remain on the premises as a holdover 
tenant to clean up the property "effectively preserved the estate."319 
Although the court found that the holdover tenancy benefited the estate, 
it appears that the estate benefited only to the extent that the estate 
discharged a CERCLA claim. However, only if the claim was the result 
of postpetition operations under chapter 11, should the claim have been 
treated as an administrative expense. If the claim arose prepetition, the 
postpetition expense provided no benefit to the estate and should not 
have received priority because the occupancy of the property during the 
cleanup did not serve to preserve the chapter 7 estate for the benefit of 
the creditors. 
The case of In re Kent Holl~nd Die Casting & Plating, Inc. 320 
314. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477-78 n.7 (1968). 
315. In re Bio-Med Lab., 131 B.R. 72 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991). The debtor 
conducted business on leased premises. Id. at 73. The debtor operated under chapter 
11 for a year before conversion of the case to chapter 7. Id. After conversion, the 
trustee discovered hazardous waste on the property and the EPA required disposal in 
compliance with environmental laws. Id. at 74. The chapter 7 trustee occupied the 
property for five months for the purpose of carrying out the hazardous waste disposal. 
Id. 




320. Windolph Trust v. Leitch (In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, Inc.), 
125 B.R. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991). The chapter 11 debtor assumed a lease 
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illustrates the proper treatment of postpetition environmental claims 
asserted against a chapter 7 and chapter 11 bankruptcy estate. The 
environmental liability which arose during the chapter 11 case resulting 
from the debtor's breach of a lease agreement was accorded administra-
tive priority. The liability which arose under the lease was incurred so 
that the debtor could receive the benefits of the lease during the ongoing 
operations of the debtor's business postpetition. The environmental 
liability which arose during the chapter 7 case, resulting from the 
debtor's breach of the lease agreement, was also entitled to administra-
tive priority but was limited to the actual value conferred on the estate 
as a result of the breach. Rental value was the very most to which the 
lessor would be entitled as an administrative expense. The National 
Bankruptcy Conference (NBC) has proposed a similar, though slightly 
different, rule for granting administrative expense status to environmental 
claims.321 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Determining the proper treatment of environmental claims in 
bankruptcy requires recognizing established priorities in three areas of 
law-the priority of bankruptcy law relative to environmental law, the 
priority of environmental claims relative to other claims outside of 
bankruptcy law, and the priority of environmental claims relative to 
other claims within bankruptcy law. These priorities have been 
considered in the analysis of when an environmental claim arises, the 
postpetition which included an indemnification agreement for environmental liability. 
Id. at 496. Two and a half years later, the debtor's case was converted to chapter 7. 
Id. at 495. 
321. The rules governing administrative expense priority: 
1. Costs expended postpetition to clean up prepetition contamination of 
property owned but not operated by the debtor postpetition should be entitled 
to administrative expense priority only to the extent that the costs ( 1) actually 
enhance the value of the property or (2) are necessary to carry out the trustee's 
or debtor in possession's duty to protect the public from immediate danger 
from environmental harm prior to abandonment or sale. The amount of any 
other cleanup costs should be treated as a general 
unsecured claim. 
2. Costs expended to clean up contamination of property operated postpetition 
or to prevent postpetition pollution should be entitled to administrative expense 
priority. 
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 88, at 30. 
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extent and consequences of a trustee's abandonment power, and 
environmental claim priority in order to define and evaluate criteria for 
characterizing environmental claims and for determining their proper 
priority in bankruptcy. 
An environmental claim against a debtor should arise when the 
debtor's conduct results in liability under environmental law, irrespective 
of when environmental harm actually occurs, is manifested, is fully 
known or knowable, or is remediated. The environmental liability may 
be contingent, unmatured, or unliquidated. For example, a contingent 
CERCLA claim will arise when there is a release or threatened release 
of a hazardous substance. 
The bankruptcy estate should be liable for prepetition environmental 
claims incurred by the debtor. Since the Bankruptcy Code does not 
distinguish environmental claims from other claims, environmental 
claims should be treated just as any other claims. A prepetition 
environmental claim, like any other prepetition claim, should be 
discharged unless it falls within an exception to discharge provided in 
the Bankruptcy Code. 
An environmental claim, like most unsecured claims, should be 
treated as a general unsecured claim unless it is entitled to priority 
treatment as an administrative expense. Administrative priority should 
be granted for postpetition costs incurred in satisfying a prepetition 
environmental claim only if the expenditure is necessary to protect the 
public from immediate danger from the environmental harm. Any other 
expenditures made to satisfy a prepetition environmental claim should 
be treated as a general unsecured claim. 
The bankruptcy estate may incur postpetition liability under environ-
mental law because of postpetition ownership or operation of property. 
In addition, the estate may incur postpetition liability based on the 
trustee's duty to abide by state law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 959. 
Nevertheless, postpetition environmental claims should not automatically 
be entitled to administrative expense priority simply because of their 
"environmental" nature. In a reorganization case, only those expendi-
tures made to satisfy postpetition environmental claims resulting from 
the continued operations of the debtor's business during reorganization 
should be treated as an administrative expense. In a liquidation case, 
expenditures made to satisfy postpetition environmental claims should 
be treated as an administrative expense only to the extent they provide 
an actual benefit to the bankruptcy estate. 
DEBORAH E. PARKER 
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